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THE CHANGING FACE OF RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CASE STUDY OF TIBET
Robert D. Sloane*

The United States recognizes the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR)—hereinafter referred to as “Tibet”—to be
part of the People’s Republic of China.
The
preservation and development of Tibet’s unique
religious, cultural, and linguistic heritage and
protection of its people’s fundamental human rights
continue to be of concern.

—U.S. Department of State1
INTRODUCTION

The above quotation appears in the chapter of the U.S.
Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices that reviews the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Its two sentences stand in a strange relationship to
one another: the first affirms that Tibet is a “part of”
China;2 the second, however, acknowledges that Tibetans
* Law Clerk, Hon. Robert D. Sack, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
J.D. Yale Law School, 2000. From 2000 to 2001, the author worked, under the
auspices of Yale Law School’s Robert L. Bernstein Fellowship in International
Human Rights, for the Tibet Justice Center (formerly the International Committee
of Lawyers for Tibet); he presently serves as a member of the Board of Directors.
The views expressed here, however, are personal and do not necessarily represent
those of the Tibet Justice Center. The author acknowledges with gratitude the
invaluable comments and suggestions of W. Michael Reisman, Gregory H. Fox, and
Elizabeth Brundige.
1
U.S. Dep’t of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (U.S.
Gov’t Printing Office, Feb. 25, 2001).
2
It also corroborates China’s official position that the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR), the central region of the geographic Tibetan plateau that corresponds roughly
to the former Tibetan provinces of “Ü” and “Tsang” is Tibet. See INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, TIBET: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 49 (1997)
[hereinafter INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS]. China incorporated the eastern regions of
Tibet, the former Tibetan provinces of Amdo and Kham, into the present Chinese
provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, and Sichuan.
Id.
See also TIBET
INFORMATION NETWORK & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CUTTING OFF THE
SERPENT’S HEAD, TIGHTENING CONTROL IN TIBET 1994-1995 1 & n.1 (1996) (noting
that Hugh Richardson, the last British representative to Tibet, described
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are not Chinese. Put differently, while the U.S. State
Department recognizes Tibet as part of the Chinese state
(the PRC), it at the same time recognizes that Tibetans are
not now—and never have been—a subset of the Chinese
people. This difference is critical. At least since World War
II, the decline of imperial empires, and decolonization, the
theoretical bedrock of governmental legitimacy has resided
in the self-determination of peoples.3 Yet governmental
practices of recognition have not always followed suit. In
principle, states should recognize exclusively legitimate
governments, those that exercise authority on the basis of
democratic institutions that effectuate their peoples right to
self-determination; in practice, states more often recognize
governments as a matter of political expedience or to
further their diplomatic and economic agenda.
But recognition no longer remains the exclusive province
of sovereign states. Today, the international stage includes
a number of non-state, quasi-state, and transnational
actors that exert varying degrees of influence over
“ethnographic Tibet” as encompassing all of the TAR, as well as the Tibetaninhabited regions of the neighboring Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu,
and Yunnan).
3
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General
Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1976, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“[A]ll peoples have the
right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the
duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the [U.N.] Charter.”).
The meaning of the “self-determination of peoples” forms the subject of longstanding debate. E.g., Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era:
A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 733, 736-56 (1995) (reviewing competing
conceptions of the “self” entitled to determination); see also Ved P. Nanda, SelfDetermination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 257 (1981); Lung-chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H.
Weston eds., 1976).
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recognition
practices;
for
example,
international
institutions and organizations, such as the European
Parliament and the Organization of American States; nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch,
the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization, and
the International Commission of Jurists; and, not least, the
United Nations, which is not a single actor but a blanket
label subsuming multiple organs and institutions, many of
which issue judgments, resolutions, and declarations of
recognition. Moreover, because most modern democracies
manifest a separation of powers—dispersing legislative,
executive, and judicial authority—these institutions, too, do
not always agree with one another. Conflicting recognition
judgments therefore can sometimes arise within a state.
Tibet is a case in point. The State Department recognizes
Tibet as “part of” China.4 Congress disagrees: Tibet is a
sovereign state under illegal foreign occupation. Its “true
representatives . . . continue to be His Holiness the Dalai
Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.”5
Inevitably, non-state decisions (and conflicting decisions
within a state) to recognize, or withhold recognition from,
another putative state or government do not always
conform to the more expedient determinations of
sovereigns. Broadly speaking, for analytic purposes, we
might distinguish three forms of recognition: first, political
recognition, the formal acts by which one sovereign
recognizes another’s claim to statehood or legitimate
6
governance; second, legal recognition, a judgment of
4

U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 1.
S. Res.169, 104th Cong. (1995). See also Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, § 536, 108 Stat. 481 (1994)
(“Congress has determined that Tibet is an occupied sovereign country under
international law.”); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, Title III, §355, 105 Stat. 647 (1991) (expressing the view
of Congress that “Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese
provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the
established principles of international law”).
6
While some dispute its utility, it is commonplace to draw a distinction between
the recognition of states and that of governments. I intend both here, though I
5
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recognition based on some set of reasonably objective legal
criteria;7 and third, civil recognition, the force of popular
moral opinion, as expressed by civil society through its
representative institutions, both governmental and nongovernmental.
An unjustly denied claim to legal
recognition often, but not always, animates civil
recognition.
These forms of recognition can, and frequently do,
overlap, but sometimes they do not. The resulting conflict
need not present a problem. Realistically, a sovereign’s
conduct of foreign relations at times demands political
recognition absent either or both legal and civil recognition.
Few today, for example, seriously advocate withdrawing
recognition from the present Chinese government, even
though its one-party dictatorship makes an ongoing
mockery of the right of China’s 1.3 billion citizens to any
genuine form of democracy or self-determination. But it
remains desirable, to the extent practicable, for sovereigns
to conform political judgments of recognition to principled
judgments of legitimacy. This encourages the gradual
internalization of democratic norms of governance and
8
respect for international human rights. The problem with
failing to distinguish political recognition from recognition
based on legal and civil legitimacy is that, over time, the
former begins to obscure the latter. Political recognition

distinguish the traditional criteria for each below. See Part I. infra.
7
See JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 45 (1987).
Thomas D. Grant suggests that in modern international law the distinction between
“recognition conceived as a legal act and recognition conceived as a political act” is
one of two critical “axes” along which the “critical tension in recognition law is
concentrated . . . .” THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND
PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION, at xx (1999).
8
See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) (arguing that nations obey, not merely conform their
behavior to, international law in large measure because of a gradual evolutionary
process “of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms”)
(reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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confers a venire of legitimacy on governments and states.
To be sure, foreign relations may always require acts that
imply sovereign recognition of illegitimate governments and
states. But in the long term, formal political recognition
tends to reinforce civil—and ultimately even legal—
perceptions of legitimacy. To conflate these forms of
recognition can therefore perpetuate manifest injustices.
This Article explores this phenomenon through the case
of Tibet, a paradigmatic example.
Tibet possesses
legitimate claims to both statehood and a government based
upon an act of self-determination by the Tibetan people.
The international community’s practices toward Tibet
exemplify certain nascent changes in recognition practices,
but at the same time, they also concededly underscore the
extent to which recognition remains a quintessential
political act.9 Tibet’s history, however, shows that the
failure to distinguish different forms of recognition can at
times generate injustices greater than the needs of political
expedience.
Part I reviews the theory of recognition relative to states
and governments. It points out ambiguities in these
debates and concludes by emphasizing the importance of
distinguishing the normative from the descriptive aspects of
recognition practices—of separating political, legal, and
civil recognition. Part II appraises Tibet’s statehood from
the perspective of each of these forms of recognition; in
particular, it examines the historical and legal sources of
the present tensions surrounding Tibet’s international
status. Part III then analyzes the concomitant question of
recognition practices toward the Tibetan government-inexile, arguably the most resilient government-in-exile in
history—again distinguishing between political, legal, and
civil recognition. I conclude by indicating how the failure to
distinguish these different forms of recognition contributes
to the atrophy of Tibet’s rightful claim to statehood, self9

Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938).
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determination, and democratic governance; and by
advocating efforts to distinguish political from legal and
civil recognition in future discourse. The latter two should
continue to promote evolving, even if still aspirational,
norms of democracy10 and the right of peoples to self11
determination. A change in state practice along the lines
sketched here would represent a small but critical step
toward vindicating Tibet’s legitimate claim to national
sovereignty and a freely determined government. More
generally, it may prevent the “self-determination of
peoples” from disintegrating into an empty relic of the era
of decolonization.12
I.

RECOGNITION: LEGAL CRITERIA, POLITICAL DISCRETION, AND
CIVIL LEGITIMACY

The concept of recognition in international law is
notoriously murky.13 Arguments about recognition typically
distinguish between the recognition of states and
governments. Failure to separate the two analytically,
according to many commentators, contributes to confusion
10

See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992); see also Letter dated 17 December 1996 from the Secretary
General addressed to the President of the General Assembly, Dec. 20, 1996, U.N. Doc.
A/51/761 (1996) (expressing support for democratization and setting forth an agenda
to promote the restoration of democracy).
11
See generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). Self-determination and democratic governance
are distinct, but intimately related, modern norms, for “[s]elf-determination
postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory to determine its
collective political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the
democratic entitlement.” Franck, supra note 10, at 52.
12
See Franck, supra note 10, at 52-60 (surveying the evolution of the principle of
self-determination of peoples and its principal application to “colonies,” as distinct
from “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities”). This distinction is critical because,
as I emphasize below, it makes legal rights depend, as they often do, on a factual
characterization, namely, whether we describe the relevant people as a “colony” or a
“minority.” See text accompanying notes 74 to 76 infra.
13
See STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE 21 (1998).
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about what criteria, if any, truly circumscribe the practice
of recognition in international law.14 But at the same time,
other scholars fault this view because, in practice, it is
virtually impossible not to conflate them: “[T]he existence of
an effective and independent government,” Brownlie writes,
“is the essence of statehood, and, significantly, recognition
of states may take the form of recognition of a
government.”15 This view may be overstated. Certainly,
criteria of recognition traditionally determinative of
statehood include some form of government; and conversely,
recognition of a government (usually) implies a
corresponding territory and population that it governs.
But as Roth argues, the oft-repeated maxim that “just as
there is no government without a state, there is no state
without a government” fails to acknowledge that “statehood
16
is a normative and not an empirical fact.” A state does not
necessarily cease if its government descends into chaos or
an invading army conquers its territory.17 To date, for
example, states continue to recognize the state of Somalia
despite the complete collapse of its government. But they
adamantly refuse to recognize Somaliland, the putative
state comprised of a relatively stable region of Somalia—
despite the fact that it arguably enjoys a functioning,
effective government. In Afghanistan, by contrast, even
though the Taliban’s government exercised effective control
14

E.g., DUGARD, supra note 7, at 6 (“[B]oth writers and courts have failed to
distinguish adequately between the recognition of States and of governments—a
confusion that has contributed substantially to the prevailing uncertainty in the law
of recognition.”). Compare GRANT, supra note 7, with M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION
OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-1995 (1997).
15
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (5th ed. 1998);
see also P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 36, 106
(1994) (suggesting that a decision not to afford a government recognition is futile
and equating recognition of a state with recognition of its government). Some
scholars, in fact, treat state and governmental recognition “as a single legal process.”
PETERSON, supra note 14, at 2.
16
BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 130
(1999) (emphasis added).
17
Id. at 130-31.
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over the vast majority of its territory, most governments
refused recognition to its extremist regime.
No one
claimed, however, that the State of Afghanistan had
vanished from the map. Both states and governments,
then, depend to a significant degree on normative
judgments by international actors.
Neither is purely
descriptive.
This does not mean that practices of
recognition toward both are not—or ought not to be—
governed by criteria more principled than realpolitik. It
does mean, however, that legal and moral criteria will only
shape and perhaps circumscribe practices of recognition; it
will rarely, if ever, dictate them.
Moreover, to shift from consideration of what criteria
govern recognition to who today employs these criteria
reveals a potential for civil society to bring state practices of
recognition into greater conformity with principles of
legitimacy, defined broadly by norms of democratic
governance and self-determination. States will remain for
the foreseeable future the paramount actors whose
judgments of recognition relative to other putative
governments and states matter.18 But the views of civil
society have tangible effects. First, they exert a not
insignificant influence on states directly; and second, by
their judgments, they help to shape the normative criteria
of recognition employed by states. This section analyzes the
traditional debates surrounding the international legal
criteria of recognition as applied to states and governments.
It also takes brief note of developments in recognition
practices toward governments that occupy and colonize
territory by military force—evinced not only by hortatory
scholarship but by state practice, judicial decisions, and
transnational processes. In general, these developments
give greater primacy to considerations of democratic
legitimacy and respect for international human rights. It
would be counterproductive to ignore the constraints of
18

See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 25 (2d. ed. 2000).
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politics and international diplomacy.
But these
developments in the law of recognition—and the principles
that animate them—should not be dismissed; they
constitute paramount long-term objectives of recognition
practices in relation to both states and governments.
A. Recognition of States

Recognition of states revolves around the somewhat
hackneyed debate between the “declaratory” and
“constitutivist” schools,19 loosely associated with legal
20
The
idealism and legal positivism, respectively.
declaratory model typically begins with the criteria
enunciated in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States.21 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention
stipulates that a state’s international legal personality
requires “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with other states.”22
These criteria imply,
respectively, a stable community, occupying a reasonably
well-defined territory, administered by a competent
government, which is capable of entering into relations with
19

For the canon on this debate, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979); PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE BIRTH OF NATIONS (1974); H.
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); Hans Kelsen,
Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605
(1941).
20
DUGARD, supra note 7, at 7-8. But see ROTH, supra note 16, at 124
(associating the constitutive view with the “positivist” conception that law among
nations arises exclusively from sovereign consent). This inconsistency results from
the different meanings each author ascribes to “positivism.” The former appears to
refer to positivism in the superficial sense that some legal rules or criteria govern
the practice of recognition. The latter means by “positivism” that all law—national
and international—emanates from a sovereign source; and the constitutivist position
appears to comport better with this view because the germane “sovereign” consists of
the group of nations that extend recognition to a putative state. See ROTH, supra
note 16, at 124.
21
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19,
reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 75 (1934) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
22
Id. art. 1.
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other states.23 Possession of each criterion may not be
indispensable; nor, by the same token, does possession of
all, ipso facto, establish statehood.24 Under the Montevideo
Convention, however, their existence creates a presumption
in favor of statehood. The declaratory model therefore
regards recognition as a “declaration” of a legal matter of
fact, i.e., the existence of an entity that meets the criteria
that define statehood.25
The competing view, the constitutivist model, regards
statehood as entirely contingent on recognition by
26
Forcefully stated, “A State is, and
preexisting states.
becomes, an International Person through recognition only
and exclusively.”27 The virtues of this view are twofold:
First, it appears to comport better with the traditional
conception of international law as “jus gentium
voluntarium—nothing more than voluntary or consensual
behavior, manifest in the practice of states.”28 And to the
extent that recognition is an issue of customary
international law—which axiomatically requires state
practice and opinio juris—it is unclear how any plausible
theory of recognition could ignore trends in state practice,
regardless of whether these trends “declare” or “constitute”
putative states. Second, an entity that lacks recognition by
other states remains, in practice, a non-entity.29 This is
because the inquiry into statehood reduces in practice to
questions about whether an entity does or should enjoy the
incidents of statehood; and these questions, in turn, depend
on whether existing states choose to extend these
23

See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 71.
Id. at 70.
25
See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 7, at 4-6; Charter of the Organization of American
States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 12, 2 U.S.T. 2394 (“The political existence of the State is
independent of recognition by other States.”).
26
See GRANT, supra note 7, at 2-4.
27
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 71, at 125 (8th ed. 1955)).
See also Kelsen, supra note 19, at 608.
28
GRANT, supra note 7, at 3.
29
Biafra’s unsuccessful secession is a case in point. See David Ijalaye, Was
“Biafra” at Any Time a State in International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 551 (1971).
24
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privileges. For this reason, the constitutivist model may at
first blush appear more pragmatic than the declaratory
model.30
Despite this, the “predominant view of recognition among
international law scholars, officials and courts today is the
declaratory view,”31 a state of affairs that Roth ascribes to
the declaratory model’s greater amenability to international
adjudication and scholarship.32 Many scholars also fault
constitutivism as unduly political; it relegates recognition to
the “unfettered political will” of existing states—pure
realpolitik.33 Moreover, as a legal matter, the constitutive
model begs a host of difficult theoretical questions. To
assert that “recognition is a precondition of the existence of
legal rights” raises questions about (i) how many states
must recognize a putative state before it becomes a “real”
state; (ii) whether it then exists only for states that have
expressed recognition, formally or informally (e.g., by
engaging in diplomatic relations); and (iii) whether
recognition must be based on “adequate knowledge of the
facts” or is instead purely discretionary.34 The constitutivist
view also appears to conflict with state practice in at least
two respects: First, while unrecognized territorial
communities are not states, neither are they terra nullius;
as a community, they enjoy some rights associated with
international legal personality. Second, courts tend to give
legal effect to acts of recognized states that antedate
recognition, a trend in tension with the notion that the
entity lacked statehood prior to its recognition by other
states.35 At the theoretical level, finally, to reduce the
30

See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that states are “abstract entities”
that must act through agents, namely, governments, which “retain [a] legal
monopoly on speaking and acting for their state”).
31
ROTH, supra note 16, at 126; PETERSON, supra note 14, at 23 (“By 1975, the
vast majority of specialists accepted the declaratory theory.”).
32
ROTH, supra note 16, at 127; PETERSON, supra note 14, at 25 (noting the
adoption of the declaratory model by national courts).
33
GRANT, supra note 7, at 19.
34
BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 89.
35
See GRANT, supra note 7, at 20-22.
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international law of recognition to a pure matter of political
will eviscerates its status as law. Roth therefore rightly
emphasizes that “some concession to the realpolitik of
international relations is essential if international law is to
be taken seriously as a framework for actual state
behavior;” but at the same time, “establishment of a
meaningful international law of peace and security requires
the collective denial of recognition of the fruits of illegal
acts; otherwise, violations of international law are
permitted to create rights in international law.”36
Resolution of the declaratory-constitutivist debate is not
the focus of this Article. For present purposes, however,
despite the novel issues raised by international incidents
since its publication a half-century ago, the views expressed
by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his seminal work37 continue to
capture, broadly speaking, the need for a balance between,
on the one hand, acknowledging the role of politics in state
practices of recognition, and on the other, maintaining the
premise that recognition is partly a legal—and not solely a
political—act. Lauterpacht wrote:
[R]ecognition consists in the application of a rule of
international law by way of ascertaining the existence
of the requisite conditions of statehood; and (b) . . .
fulfilment of that function in the affirmative sense—
and nothing else—brings into being the plenitude of
the normal rights and duties which international law
38
attaches to statehood.

This view also has the virtue—today, as in the immediate
post-War era—of “approximating most closely to the
practice of States and to a working juridical principle . . . .”39
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law adopts a
36
37
38
39

ROTH, supra note 16, at 125.
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17.
Id. at 73; see also CHEN, supra note 16, at 40-41.
LAUTHERPACHT, supra note 17, at 73.
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similar compromise, noting that a state need not extend
formal recognition to any state but is “required” to treat as
a state any entity that fulfills the conventional Montevideo
criteria.40
Tellingly, however, when jurists address recognition,
often it is not the existence of a state that is at issue, but
rather the specific incidents of statehood—for example, the
capacity to enter into agreements with other states. Yet the
incidents of statehood are relevant principally in relation to
governmental recognition.41 While scholars often cite the
42
famous Tinoco Arbitration as juridical support for the
declaratory model of statehood,43 former Chief Justice
William Howard Taft’s opinion was not about the existence
of Costa Rica (a state); it addressed the validity of the
Tinoco regime (a government)—more precisely, that
government’s capacity to enter into agreements that could
bind successive governments of Costa Rica. This again
underscores the practical difficulty in efforts to delink state
from governmental recognition. For analytic and normative
purposes, however, this should not dissuade efforts to avoid
simple conflation of the two. For clearly, just as some
states are not properly so-called despite fulfilling the
40

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202 (1987).
See CHEN, supra note 18, at 40 (noting that the “great majority of recognition
problems involve recognition of regimes as the governments of already recognized
states without affecting the continuity of legal identity of the states”). The incidents
of statehood need not exist in an all-or-nothing state. Taiwan remains perhaps the
best example of a territory that enjoys many, but not all, of the incidents of
statehood. Indeed, it is precisely those incidents that appear to China to constitute a
“declaration” of independent statehood that threatens to spark cross-strait tensions.
See generally Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait
Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453 (2000).
42
Tinoco Concessions (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rico), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923) (recognizing
the governmental legitimacy of—and, consequently, the continuity of the duties and
obligations assumed by—a coup-based government in Costa Rica that subsisted for
several years, on the ground that during this time it satisfied the “effective control”
test then prevailing as the standard by which to assess the legitimacy of
governments).
43
See GRANT, supra note 7, at 47. But see Certain German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25) (implying support for the
constitutive theory of state recognition).
41

SLOANE.DOC

120

2/9/2005 2:00 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

conventional criteria for statehood, some governments,
appraised by contemporary international norms of
legitimacy, are not properly so-called despite the existence
of a state they purport to govern and the effective control
they exercise—often by virtue of the military—over that
state’s population.
B. Recognition of Governments

To specify legal criteria for governmental recognition
proves even more theoretically difficult, for two principal
reasons: the debate over whether governmental recognition
is indeed a legal question at all (or whether, by contrast, it
is properly understood as purely political); and second, the
question of the meaning of “recognition.” Recognition
generally lies within the discretion of sovereigns. Most
scholars and statesman agree that international law does
not provide unequivocal criteria that establish a duty of
recognition under certain circumstances. The conventional
view is that “[r]ecognition, as a public act of state, is an
optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this
regard.”44 Decisions to recognize or refuse recognition to
governments remain sovereign prerogatives, exercised “in
accordance with [each state’s] policy objectives and
ideologies.”45 The Supreme Court adopted this principle
expressly in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, in which
it held that
[w]hat government is to be regarded here as
representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political
44

BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 90 (emphasis in original).
Yossi Shain, Governments-in-Exile and International Legitimation, in
GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE 219, 223 (Yossi Shain ed., 1991); see also PETERSON, supra
note 14, at 72 (noting that, while some governments have employed the “optional
criteria” consistently, for the most part “optional criteria have been asserted on an
ad hoc basis appearing more to tailor decisions to the ideological or material
interests of the recognizing state”).
45
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rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined
by the political department of the government.
Objections to its determination as well as to the
underlying policy are to be addressed to it and not to
46
the courts.”

While evolving principles of international human rights,
the U.N. Charter’s codification of the principle of nonaggression,47 and other norms suggest guidelines for
recognition, it remains true that recognition of governments
is a quintessential political act, largely unconstrained by
legal criteria.48
The second issue is the meaning of recognition as applied
to governments. Talmon’s recent study identifies two broad
potential definitions: first, “willingness or unwillingness on
the part of the recognizing government to establish or
maintain official, but not necessarily intimate, relations
49
and second,
with the government in question”;
“manifestation of the recognizing government’s [subjective]
opinion on the legal status of the government in question.”50

46

Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938); see also Pfizer v. Gov’t of
India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978); but see Nat’l Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt
Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he absence of formal recognition cannot
serve as the touchstone for determining whether the Executive Branch has
‘recognized’ a foreign nation for the purpose of granting that government access to
United States courts.”).
47
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
48
At the same time, international organizations have increasingly brokered
disputes where two putative governments, each claiming to represent the legitimate
government of a recognized state, seek international recognition. For example, in
1997, two parties sought accreditation to represent Cambodia in the General
Assembly’s fifty-second session, and that body, after receiving a report from its
credentials committee, ultimately resolved the dispute on the basis of a majority
vote. See U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/52/719 (1997). For
a review of this incident and a discussion of the above phenomenon generally, see
Suellen Ratliff, Comment, U.N. Representation Disputes: A Case Study of Cambodia
and a New Accreditation Proposal for the Twenty-First Century, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1207
(1999).
49
TALMON, supra note 13, at 23.
50
Id. at 29.
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These meanings often, but not invariably, coincide.51 In a
rough way, they correspond to the distinction sometimes
drawn between de facto and de jure recognition.52 Confusion
about these and related issues has led some statesmen and
scholars to advocate abolishing governmental recognition
on the grounds that it creates more difficulties in
international law than it solves.53
These qualifications aside, however, governments have
historically tended to invoke one of three legal theories
about governmental recognition.54 First, the traditional
(and probably still the most widely accepted) approach
recognizes governments that satisfy the “effective control”
test set forth in Tinoco: They exercise effective control over
the territory they purport to govern and possess the
concomitant ability to fulfill international obligations on its
55
behalf. In fact, some theorists assert that effective control
is the sole necessary and legally binding criterion for the
recognition of governments. “Reduced to essentials, legal
scholars’ views and governments’ actions show that there
has been only one binding rule regarding recognition
decisions since 1815: control of all or most of the state is the
necessary, but not sufficient condition for recognition as its
51

See id. at 33-43 (expounding three prominent situations in which recognition
in each of these two senses did not coincide—Great Britain’s position with respect to
the Tinoco regime of Costa Rica; the U.S. government’s treatment of the Bolshevik
regime in the Soviet Union; and the U.S. and South African governments’ longstanding refusal to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola,
which seized power in 1975 shortly after gaining independence from Portugal).
52
For a comprehensive overview, see id. at 44-111.
53
See M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should not be Abolished, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 31 (1983).
54
See Shain, supra note 45, at 223.
55
See supra note 42; HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 220
(1945) (arguing that a national legal order “begins to be valid . . . as soon as it has
become—on the whole—efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this
efficacy”); cf. Michael Reisman, Governments-in-Exile: Notes Toward a Theory of
Formation and Operation, in GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE, supra note 45, at 238
(arguing that the “term ‘government-in-exile’ is an oxymoron, for the soi-distant
government-in-exile does not control territory and, without that . . . cannot discharge
those international obligations expected of governments”).
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government.”56 Second, the Estrada Doctrine, promulgated
by the Mexican government in 1931, refuses as a matter of
principle to recognize (or not recognize) governments per se.
According to this view, only states should be accorded
recognition in international law because governmental
recognition wrongfully interferes in the domestic affairs of
sovereign nations.57 In the post-World War II era, many
governments have adopted a policy that declines formally to
recognize states.58 But in fact “a ‘recognize only states’
policy looks much like the more widely shared practice of
employing only tacit forms of recognition.”59 Finally, the

56

PETERSON, supra note 14, at 49; Peterson, supra note 53, at 37 (noting that
this rule “forbids recognizing before control is shown or continuing to recognize after
control is lost”); but see Shain, supra note 45, at 224 (noting the continued
recognition of deposed governments of the Allied Powers, despite their lack of
“effective control” over their territory during World War II).
57
The Estrada doctrine originated in the 1930 statement of Mexican Foreign
Minister Genaro Estrada that “the Mexican Government is issuing no declarations
in the sense of grants of recognition, since that nation considers that such a course is
an insulting practice and one which . . . implies that judgment of some sort may be
passed upon the internal affairs of those nations by other governments.” Press
Statement of Sept. 27, 1930, translated in 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 203 (Supp. 1931). See
generally Phillip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Estrada Doctrine, 25 AM. J.
INT’L L. 719, 723 (1931) (arguing that the “practice of extending recognition to or
withholding it from de facto governments for reasons other than those governments’
factual control of their countries is not conducive to the smooth workings of
international affairs”).
58
See TALMON, supra note 13, at 3 (“A study on the recognition of governments
in international law may, at first sight, seem rather outdated at a time when more
and more States declare that their policy is to recognize States, not governments.”);
see, e.g., Letter from the Swiss Embassy in London to Stefan Talmon, May 12, 1993,
reprinted in TALMON, supra, at 284-85, Appendix I (affirming that Switzerland’s
general policy is to recognize States only).
59
PETERSON, supra note 14, at 181; see also TALMON, supra note 13, at 3 (stating
that the adoption of this policy “signifies only a change in the method of according
recognition, not the abolition of the recognition of governments as such”). Moreover,
even governments that purport to have abolished governmental recognition per se
generally make exceptions that permit them to decline recognition to unacceptable
regimes or to regimes declared illegitimate by the U.N. Security Council acting
under its Chapter VII powers. See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 35. To date, the
three principal instances of U.N. mandated “non-recognition” have been toward
South Africa’s regime in Namibia, Ian Smith’s regime in Rhodesia, and General
Cedras’ regime in Haiti. See id. at 177.
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Tobar Approach60 stipulates that governmental recognition
should be conditioned on democratic legitimacy: Only
governments that assume power by means of a free and fair
electoral process merit recognition. Again, it is important
to emphasize that these three theories may be mutually
incompatible. None must be adopted as a matter of
international law. States employ one or more of these
approaches to justify decisions to recognize governments.
But these decisions remain discretionary, often influenced if
not dictated by foreign policy objectives.61
In addition, certain “optional criteria,”62 which to varying
degrees overlap with the above theories, often appear in
recognition discourse. These include (i) popular support,
which means, at a minimum, “acquiescence in the new
regime’s rule,” and, at the other extreme, affirmative
endorsement;63 (ii) legitimacy, which means, at a minimum,
that the regime assumed power by prescribed legal
methods, whether constitutional procedures, custom, or
otherwise, and, in its strong form, that the governmental
regime is legitimate by reference to contemporary
democratic norms of “consent by the governed;”64 and
finally, (iii) competence, the ability and willingness to fulfill
international obligations.

60

This approach originated in “Carlos R. Tobar’s proposal that legality of origin
be a criterion for recognition among the American republics.” PETERSON, supra note
14, at 58.
61
See Shain, supra note 45, at 223. See also PETERSON, supra note 14, at 74
(“[G]overnments still insist on the right to select and use certain optional criteria
even though they are now exercising that right less frequently and in favour of fewer
criteria.”).
62
See generally PETERSON, supra note 14, at 51-76 (detailing the main trends in
criteria for governmental recognition beyond the widely-accepted necessity that the
putative government exercise “effective control.”).
63
See id. at 52.
64
See id. at 57; see also Peterson, supra note 53, at 37 (describing the rise of
monarchical and democratic legitimism as a basis for recognition decisions in,
respectively, Europe during the Quadruple alliance era, 1815-1830, and the
Americas in the early 1900s).
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Of these “optional” criteria, (iii) is actually just a variant
on effective control. It suggests that volition, not just
ability, to carry out international obligations merits
consideration. Popular support, by contrast, is properly
understood as coterminous with legitimacy; it only makes
sense to include popular support as a criterion if regimes
without it are “illegitimate.” For example, if dynastic
transfers of power are legitimate, then why extend or
withhold recognition to a dynastic government based on
whether its population happens to favor the current
monarch? A similar reduction applies to the remaining
65
optional criteria that appear in recognition discourse: a
government’s military inde-pendence, the degree of violence
it employs to seize power, whether it originates by
procedures in conformity with international law, and the
degree to which it respects international human rights—all
of these considerations depend in the main on normative
postulates about legitimacy.
Governmental recognition, reduced to its skeletal
features, therefore appears to be a two-part inquiry: first,
does the regime exercise effective control over the territory
it aspires to govern (and perhaps also the volition to fulfill
international obligations on its behalf); and second, is it
legitimate? The latter criterion invites many questions,
foremost, the meaning of legitimacy. But note that, while
the effective-control prong of governmental recognition
speaks to the pragmatics of foreign relations, the legitimacy
prong need not. A government could coherently recognize a
regime’s effective control over some territory—and therefore
deal with that regime as its de facto government—but at
the same time not extend the regime formal recognition—
and therefore refuse to validate its de jure claim to
65

See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 68. Other less prominent “proposed criteria”
include independence from foreign military support; respect for other states’ rights;
the absence of extreme violence in the seizure of power; genesis in accord with
international law; and respect for human rights. See id. at 77-85. Yet all of these
“have not been invoked by governments very often, and have received only
occasional attention from legal scholars.” Id. at 84.
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legitimacy.66 This idea in part animates the debate over the
spectrum between so-called de facto and de jure
recognition.67
Scholarly discourse on recognition evinces frustration
with the nebulous criteria for both state and governmental
recognition. But the fact that governments use recognition
for political purposes, rather than extend it solely to
entities that fulfill clear legal criteria, need not count
against recognition or counsel its “abolition,” an unlikely
development in any case. It does mean, however, that
international law must pay attention to the normative
effects of recognition and non-recognition. International law
should seek to shape state practice so that the political
discretion that inevitably will continue to form a major
component of recognition reinforces, rather than erodes,
emerging norms of legitimacy—in particular, respect for the
right of peoples to political self-determination and
democratic governance.
C. Recognition’s Two Faces: Separating the Normative from the
Descriptive

The concept of recognition, like many issues in
international law, suffers from a chronic failure to
distinguish the normative from the descriptive. The two do
not, of course, invariably converge, and they serve distinct
functions in international law. It is axiomatic that state
practice and opinio juris comprise the bases for ascertaining
customary international law.68 But in the context of the law
66

See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 53, at 49 (observing that non-recognition, in a
international framework that ordinarily “recognizes” governments based on the
Tinoco criterion of “effective control,” can express severe disapproval with symbolic
efficacy).
67
See TALMON, supra note 13, at 107 (“The granting of express de facto
recognition ‘only’ to an effective government has been used by States in order to
indicate that in their opinion the regime in power does not qualify as the State’s
government or that they are unwilling to treat with it as such.”).
68
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 6, 1945, U.S.T.S. 993, 59
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of recognition—assuming that recognition is at least in part
a matter of law and not exclusively realpolitik—
commentators tend to focus on the former requirement.
This is understandable: Day-to-day international relations
concern state practice far more than the multiplicity of
opinions of jurists, politicians, international institutions,
and, to a lesser extent in the modern world order, nongovernmental organizations—in short, those materials that
scholars frequently consult to ascertain opinio juris.
But a parochial focus on the political aspects of
recognition, which I loosely identify with the descriptive
element of recognition practices, often fails to acknowledge
that its legal and civil analogues—roughly speaking, the
normative elements of recognition practices—have in fact
changed since World War II. For example, with the
possible exception of some rogue states (or “states of
concern,” in former Secretary of State Albright’s memorable
phrase) most governments now acknowledge that the
acquisition of territory by military force, a method
previously deemed valid under international law, will no
longer be tolerated;69 ex injuria jus non oritur (a right
cannot originate in an illegal act).70 Second, popular
sovereignty, once a concept foreign to all but a few Western
nation-states, now constitutes a paramount normative basis
for recognition of governmental legitimacy.71
Finally,
Stat. 1031, art.38 (1945).
69
See SHARON D. KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 218-34 (1996); see also
BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 78.
70
E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202(2) (1987) (“A
State has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that has
attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force
in violation of the United Nations Charter.”).
71
See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990); cf. Franck, supra
note 10. Recent commentators note “a growing tendency on the part of the
international community to take actions aimed at restoring democratically elected
governments that [have] been overthrown or suspended.” Morton H. Halperin &
Kristen Lomasney, Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record, 9 J.
DEMOCRACY 134 (No. 2) (April 1998). The authors note that, since 1993, in Albania,

SLOANE.DOC

128

2/9/2005 2:00 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

colonization, another predominant and largely accepted
feature of the pre-World War II era, is clearly no longer
valid practice under international law.72
“[A]s the cliché has it, . . . ‘we are all [legal] realists
now’”73 in a colloquial sense. We acknowledge that factcharacterization by decision-makers frequently determines
“what the law is.” But we must be careful not to draw the
wrong conclusion from this observation. Particularly in the
context of international law—where determining “what the
law is” often requires resorting to how state actors construe
it and, moreover, to what they believe it to be—legal realism
does not counsel cynicism or apathy. Rather, it requires
principled lawyers and statesmen to ascertain, after
considering those factors that determine “what the law is,”
how, given an understanding of the influence these factors
exert, they can shape law into what it ought to be. As
Christine M. Chinkin recently wrote:
“[L]aw is an instrument of civil society” that does not
belong to governments, whether acting alone or in
institutional arenas. Accordingly, when states fail to
exercise their obligations to ensure justice, civil society
can and should step in. To ignore violative conduct is
74
to invite its repetition . . . .

Civil society must not be discounted simply because the
topic under consideration is an issue of international law in
Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, and Serbia, the international community intervened to
restore democracy; that in Burundi, Niger, and Sierra Leone, similar efforts resulted
in some progress; and that in Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, and Nigeria, such efforts
failed—at least for the time being. See id. at 136-45.
72
E.g., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971).
73
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,
76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997).
74
Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Women’s International Tribunal on
Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 339 (2001) (quoting
Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 17, 29 (James Crawford ed., 1988)).
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which states—and by extension their political elites—
exercise predominant influence. When governments violate
the norms embraced by civil society and professed with
growing frequency in judicial and academic opinions, it is
critical to ensure that state political elites remain
accountable for those violations. Indeed, one of the central
objectives of the right to freedom of expression is to ensure
that, in a democratic society, these violations do not remain
obscured by the veil of political expediency. With this
objective in mind, Part II examines the status of Tibet
under international law and the influence of recognition
75
practices—political, legal, and civil—on this status.
II. THE STATUS OF THE STATE OF TIBET:
POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND CIVIL DIMENSIONS

The U.S. State Department, as noted at the outset of this
Article, recognizes Tibet as “part of” the People’s Republic of
China. But it then emphasizes that “[p]reservation and
development of Tibet’s unique religious, cultural, and
linguistic heritage and protection of its people’s
fundamental human rights continue to be of concern.”76
This phrasing is not accidental. As Franck observed in his
seminal article, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, “the [ICCPR] makes an important distinction
between the right of each nation’s collective polis and the
77
The former
rights of minorities within each state . . . .”
75

Recent manifestations of “regimes of non-recognition” include state practices
toward the State Law and Order Council’s government in Myanmar (Burma), the
Taliban’s government in Afghanistan, and General Raoul Cedras’ government in
Haiti. These cases prove less analogous to Tibet’s circumstances, however, because
they involve internal changes in government, rather than invasion and occupation
by foreign military forces. They therefore raise questions about governmental
legitimacy, but do not serve to illustrate the response of the international
community to recognition questions that arise when one state purports to
“incorporate” another; as, for example, in the cases of Indonesia’s invasion of East
Timor and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
76
U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 1.
77
Franck, supra note 10, at 58.
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enjoy the right to democratic governance; the latter, only
the “right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language”78—that is,
to the preservation of their “religious, cultural and
linguistic heritage . . . .”
The decision factually to
characterize the Tibetan people as an “ethnic minority”
rather than a “national polis” therefore determines their
theoretical rights under international law. Like the Clinton
Administration’s deliberate decision to refer to the
decimation of the Tutsis in Rwanda as a “civil war” rather
than a “genocide,”79 the State Department’s characterization
of Tibet reflects an understanding of the legal consequences
that might follow from calling a spade a spade.
Military conquest, at least prior to the twentieth century,
could confer sovereignty over foreign states. But today, few
dispute that “illegal occupation cannot of itself terminate
statehood.”80 For this reason, the international community
rightly objected to Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990,81
to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,82 and
78

ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 27.
See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 149-54 (1998).
80
BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 78; see generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).
81
th
See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45 Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990) (condemning the Iraqi invasion and calling for the immediate withdrawal of
th
Iraq’s troops from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45 Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) (noting that Iraq “has usurped the authority of the legitimate
Government of Kuwait” and calling upon member states, inter alia, to refuse to
th
recognize any regime established by Iraq); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45 Sess.,
2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) (calling upon states and international
organizations “not to recognize [Iraq’s] annexation, and to refrain from any action or
dealing that might be interpreted as an indirection recognition of the annexation”);
th
st
S.C. Res 687, U.N. SCOR, 46 Sess, 2981 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)
(welcoming “the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government” and reiterating the
illegality of Iraq’s “unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”). For an analysis of
the U.N. resolutions passed during the Gulf War, see generally Oscar Schachter,
United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 452 (1991).
82
See G.A. Res. 37, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, 70th plen. mtg. at 17,
79
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to Indonesia’s purported annexation of East Timor in
1975.83 Why then does every state continue to validate
China’s sovereignty over Tibet, when its only conceivable
claim, as shown repeatedly by historical and international
law scholarship, is military annexation?
The answer is not, as some appear to believe, that Tibet’s
legal status is “debatable.”84 To my knowledge, without
exception, every independent scholar who has examined
this question concluded that Tibet qualified under
international law as a sovereign state in 1950, the year
during which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded
and colonized Tibet.85 Nor can the answer be that time’s
passage extinguished Tibet’s once valid claim to
statehood—no more than the passage of twenty-five years
of Indonesian rule extinguished East Timor’s right to
statehood.
The unsurprising reason that no state
recognizes the State of Tibet is that it had the misfortune to
be invaded by a powerful state and at a time when the
international
community’s attention was diverted
U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980). As a member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union
vetoed that organ’s resolution condemning its invasion. See U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess.,
2190th mtg. at 57, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2190 (1980).
83
See sources cited infra note 256.
84
See, e.g., Charney & Prescott, supra note 41, at 456 (“[E]ven if China’s
sovereignty over Outer Mongolia or Tibet is considered debatable, there does not
seem to be any basis for arguing that China’s sovereignty over Taiwan in 1894 was
less than complete.”).
85
See, e.g., WARREN SMITH, TIBETAN NATION (1996); MELVYN GOLDSTEIN, A
HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET, 1913-1951 (1989); MICHAEL C. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG,
THE STATUS OF TIBET: HISTORY, RIGHTS AND PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1987); Dawa Norbu, Selfdetermination [sic] in the Post-Soviet Era: A Case Study of
Tibet, 34 J. INT’L L. STUD. 237 (1997). To assert that Tibet qualified as an
independent state in 1950 does not imply that Tibet was always an independent
state; nor, however, does it confirm that Tibet was always a part of China. In fact,
in a strong sense, both sides of this argument suffer from a categorical mistake. The
distinctly modern Western conception of the nation-state, with precise borders and a
single centralized government, is probably inapposite to pre-twentieth century
China and Tibet alike. See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra, at xviii (“The student of
Tibet’s past legal status inevitably confronts the problem of finding legal categories
and terms appropriate to describe and define the position of this Central Asian
country in relation to its neighbors.”).
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elsewhere, notably to Korea. Today, China is a nuclear
power; it exercises a veto as a permanent member of the
U.N. Security Council; and economically, it has become,
since the government’s de facto abandonment of socialism,86
a tremendous potential market that states feel they cannot
afford to neglect by antagonizing China’s political elite.
Political realism and economic self-interest, in short,
motivate states’ formal recognition practices toward China’s
assertion of sovereignty over Tibet. It would be foolish to
deny the influence of these factors. But in terms of legal
and civil recognition, Tibet is no more a “part of” China
than Kuwait was a “part of” Iraq or East Timor a “part of”
Indonesia. By reference to legal and civil recognition
criteria, Tibet remains a sovereign state, at least and until
China permits the Tibetan people to exercise their right to
determine freely their political status.
Today, as the United States struggles to figure out
exactly what its “one China” policy means,87 one matter
should be clear: Tibet has no place in it. The United States,
other members of the United Nations, regional
organizations, and the United Nations itself, should
abandon the fiction that Tibet is “part of” China. This
practice lends unnecessary moral authority to the ongoing
colonial exploitation of Tibet’s land and people.
International policy must recognize political reality. To
ignore it accomplishes nothing and often proves
counterproductive.
No one at present can or should
seriously advocate military action to vindicate Tibet’s right
to statehood. But this same reality does not necessarily
86

See generally JASPER BECKER, THE CHINESE (2000) (detailing within each
strata of Chinese society the gradual transformation of China’s economy to a quasicapitalist system since the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping).
87
E.g., Taiwan Stands Up, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 23 (noting that while
the Clinton Administration “sees no reason to change the ‘one China’ policy that has
guided America’s relations with China for nearly three decades,” Senator Jesse
Helms and House Representative Tom DeLay, among many others in the Congress,
reject the notion that this policy dictates appeasement toward China’s threats in
response to calls for Taiwanese independence).
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counsel diplomatic appeasement of China’s political elite by
indulging the fiction that Tibet is “part of” China in every
national and international fora.
At the outset of the Cold War, the handful of states with
knowledge of Tibet’s legal status—Great Britain, India, and
the United States—were led, largely for ephemeral reasons,
to indulge this fiction.
But the combination of
circumstances that precluded genuine consideration of
Tibet’s right to statehood during the Cold War should not,
at present, obscure a clear fact: In an era of decolonization,
88
Tibet remains the world’s largest colony, a state under
illegal foreign occupation. The Tibetan people are not one
of China’s purported fifty-five “national minorities”; they
are a national polis. To recognize this fact constitutes an
essential predicate to enabling the Tibetan people to
exercise the same right that all colonized peoples have—in
theory, if not always in practice—enjoyed in the post-War
era: self-determination.
The next Part of this Article reviews Tibet’s efforts to
achieve formal recognition prior to China’s invasion, the
historical and legal bases that established Tibet’s statehood
at that time, and the absence of a plausible theory under
which Tibet lost this status. My intention here is not to
attempt an exhaustive analysis of Tibet’s right to
independence, for the scholarship on this issue is already
voluminous and, for the most part, unambiguous in its
conclusions.
Instead, I hope to place the facts
demonstrative of Tibet’s legal status within a context that
enables examination of their implications for Tibet’s formal
recognition in the contemporary world order.
The
increasing complexity of recognition practices provides
international actors—both governmental and nongovernmental—with an opportunity gradually to influence
88

See UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS, TIBET SUPPORT
GROEP NEDERLAND, & INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, CHINA’S TIBET: THE
WORLD’S LARGEST REMAINING COLONY (1997).
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state practice in an effort to bring political declarations of
recognition into greater conformity with principled
judgments of legitimacy. In the case of Tibet, political
machinations at the outset of the Cold War precluded its
formal recognition by state elites. Tibet failed to secure
recognition at the United Nations, and this left its
government with little choice but to negotiate with Beijing.
Negotiations culminated in a coercive and fraudulent treaty
that nominally extinguished Tibet’s statehood. But under
international law, neither China’s 1950 invasion nor Tibet’s
alleged accession to this treaty accomplished this. Tibet, no
less than—indeed, far more than—the former colonies of
Western Europe, possessed a legitimate claim to statehood
in 1950. That claim remains valid today. It perpetuates a
discord between, on the one hand, Tibet’s legal and civil
recognition, and on the other, its political recognition.
The political machinations that led state elites formally to
recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet during the Cold
War, however, no longer justify this disconnect.
By
continuing to denominate Tibet a “part of” China, the
international community and its constituent states validate
China’s military conquest, annexation, and colonization of
Tibet.89 By contrast, to recognize the existence of the State
of Tibet would be a—perhaps small, but symbolically
important and politically realistic—step toward restoring to
the Tibetan people their fundamental right to selfdetermination.

89

See generally id. See also TIBET INFORMATION NETWORK, CHINA’S GREAT
LEAP WEST (2000) (reviewing exhaustively the colonial activities that China recently
established as a matter of national policy in its recent proclamation of the “Western
Development” campaign in Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang)).
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A. Tibet at the United Nations: The Struggle to Secure Political
Recognition

“Tibet’s story,” wrote journalist John Avedon in 1979, “is
that of an ancient nation hurled into the twentieth century
by the loss of its sovereignty.”90
Prior to the early
twentieth-century, Tibet’s geographic isolation, coupled
with the religious aristocracy’s parochial resistance to social
reform,91 led naturally to political isolation.92 Indeed, until
threatened by the military momentum of the PLA, which
defeated Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT in 1949, Tibet’s foreign
relations were limited largely to Great Britain, India (itself
a British colony until August 15, 1947), Russia, and China.93
94
Between 1913 and 1947 Tibet had a unique opportunity to
emerge definitively as a modern nation-state, but its “elite
chose to remain oblivious to what was going on around
them,” reflecting their resistance to any political change
90

JOHN F. AVEDON, IN EXILE FROM THE LAND OF SNOWS, at xiii (1979).
See TSERING SHAKYA, DRAGON IN THE LAND OF SNOWS 5 (1999).
See AVEDON, supra note 90, at 19; VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 2646 (explaining Tibet’s attempts to remain closed to foreign trade and exchanges in
the late colonial period). The Dalai Lama wrote that “deliberate isolation” best
describes pre-twentieth century Tibet. TENZIN GYATSO, MY LAND AND MY PEOPLE
38 (1962).
93
Tibet’s relationship with China stretches back to the ninth century, when the
Tibetan Empire (first unified by Songtsen Gampo in the seventh century) signed a
treaty with the Tang dynasty. See Sino-Tibet Treaty of 821/823 A.D., reprinted in
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 287. The academic debate over Tibet’s
historical independence from China, however, focuses largely on the cho-yun
(“priest-patron”) relationship that Tibet established with the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty
in the thirteenth century. This relationship reemerged during China’s prolonged
domination by the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty (1611-1911).
94
This period, in which Tibet enjoyed de facto (and arguably de jure)
independence as a nation-state, extends roughly from the signing of the Simla
Convention of 1914 to the date upon which India gained independence, thus
extinguishing Great Britain’s interest in maintaining Tibet as a region unvarnished
by Chinese sovereignty. See Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet
(Simla Convention), July 3, 1914, Gr. Brit.-China-Tibet, art. 2, reprinted in VAN
WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 322-25, 323 (recognizing Tibet’s “territorial
integrity,” the legitimate administration of Tibet by the Dalai Lama’s government in
Lhasa, and stating that both Great Britain and China, respectively, undertake “not
to convert Tibet into a Chinese province” and “not to annex Tibet or any portion of
it”).
91
92

SLOANE.DOC

136

2/9/2005 2:00 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

perceived to threaten their traditional sociopolitical
predominance.95 Consequently, in 1949, after the PLA
emerged victorious from China’s civil war, “Tibet was not
equipped to oppose China either militarily or socially.”96
Ironically, the isolation Tibet’s government had selfconsciously cultivated to shield Tibet from foreign
domination proved the principal reason that Tibet found
itself unable to achieve political recognition as a modern
nation-state—and thus powerless to resist foreign
domination by communist China.
In 1950, most constituents of the nascent United Nations
remained entirely ignorant of Tibet’s status. To the extent
that Tibet’s status occupied them at all, they remained
content to defer to the views of India, Britain, and the
United States, the sole states able to speak authoritatively
on the status of Tibet—with the obvious exception of China,
which, needless to say, maintained, then as now, that Tibet
is its internal affair,97 solely within its domestic
jurisdiction.98 But India, Britain, and the United States
refused, for ephemeral diplomatic reasons, to support
formal consideration of Tibet’s status at the United Nations
directly. Nor would they corroborate publicly what they
acknowledged privately: Tibet was a sovereign state
threatened imminently by communist Chinese aggression.
In a pattern that became familiar in retrospect, the
United States government, though internally supportive of
Tibet, deferred to Great Britain, which, “[a]part from India,
who for historical and geo-political reasons was most
95

SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 5.
Id.
97
While Mao Zedong’s government was the first twentieth-century Chinese
regime capable of asserting this claim militarily, China had, since independence
from the Manchus in 1911, asserted historical “ownership” of Tibet. See Sun YatSen, Lecture (Jan. 27, 1924), in SUN YAT-SEN: HIS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALS
163 (Lenoard Shihlien Hsü trans. & ed. 1933); see also CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA’S
DESTINY 11 (1947) (asserting that Tibet’s “allegiance to China dates back to the Sui
and Tang Dynasties”).
98
See U.N. CHART., art. 2, para. 7.
96
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directly affected by the Chinese invasion, . . . was the only
nation [that] had substantial knowledge and historical
contact with Tibet.”99 Britain, in turn, deferred to the newly
independent government of India, which it viewed as the
inheritor of any strategic interests in may once have
maintained in Tibet. But India declined to take a firm
stance on Tibet because it feared to provoke China with any
act that might exacerbate their already tenuous
relationship. This pattern emerged before the Korean War,
but that conflict reinforced and entrenched it. India, in
particular, found itself involved in mediation efforts in
Korea and feared complicating these delicate negotiations
by antagonizing China with forthright support for Tibet.
Consequently, at a critical juncture, “there were no major
powers prepared to support Tibet’s appeal to the UN;” and
the State of Tibet “faded into obscurity.”100
1. The Attempt to Secure International Support for Formal
Recognition

In 1949, Tibet’s government struggled desperately to
modernize, a process hampered by internal political
struggles.101 At this stage, however, it finally realized that,
without a modern military, only international recognition
could protect its sovereignty. It therefore sought to secure
recognition by the United Nations.102
By then, the
imminence of the Chinese threat had become clear to the
Kashag (the Tibetan cabinet), and as the Dalai Lama
recalled in his autobiography, “Tibet had neither the
material resources nor the arms or men to defend its
99

SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 54.
Id. at 61.
See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85 (providing a detailed historical
analysis of Tibetan political crises in the pre-War era).
102
While the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who struggled to modernize Tibet in the
1920s, “had contemplated joining the League of Nations, . . . fear of having to open
the country to outsiders had prevented [Tibet’s rulers] from seeking membership.”
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 53.
100
101
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integrity against serious attack . . . .”103 In December of
1949, the Kashag solicited Great Britain, the sole Western
state with whom it had maintained significant formal
relations in the past, to support Tibet’s bid for U.N.
membership. A telegram to the British Foreign Office
stated:
As all the world knows that Tibet and Communist
China cannot have any common sympathy by reason of
religion and principles of life which are just the
opposite, therefore in order to defend our country
against impending threat of Communist invasion and
also to preserve our future independence and freedom,
we consider it most essential for Tibet to secure
admission of her membership in the United Nations
104
General Assembly.

The Foreign Office, however, refused to consider this. It
recognized that the proposal would face a veto from Russia
and China.105 More critically, Britain’s “interest in Tibet in
the past had been the result of the need to secure its
position in India. Now that strategic considerations had
devolved to the GOI [Government of India], there were
relatively few British economic interests in the country.”106
Britain therefore referred Tibet’s solicitation to K.P.S.
Menon, India’s Foreign Secretary. Menon, in turn, took to
heart the advice of Sardar Pannikar, India’s Ambassador to
China, who had remarked that India should “wash her
103

GYATSO, supra note 92, at 60. Avedon notes that, following the Thirteenth
Dalai Lama’s death, the Tibetan government virtually ignored the army and, at the
time of China’s invasion, Tibet’s formal military forces amounted to “little more than
a glorified border patrol . . . .” AVEDON, supra note 90, at 27.
104
Telegram from the Kashag to the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin,
Dec. 3, 1949, reprinted in SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 18.
105
Bevin’s telegram in reply noted in part that “the Kashag [should realize] that
admission to the UNO [United Nations Organization] is subject to the approval not
merely of the UNO Assembly but also of the Security Council where the veto is
operative, and for obvious reasons it would be quite unrealistic in present
circumstances to hope to secure Tibet’s admission . . . .” See id.
106
Id. at 19.
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hands completely of Tibet.”107 Menon feared that any action
on Tibet’s behalf would appear to confirm China’s
allegations of an Anglo-Indian conspiracy in Tibet. At a
minimum, such action threatened to exacerbate Sino-Indian
relations at a time when India could not afford this risk.108
India’s apprehensions increased when the Chinese
government warned India that “receiving ‘an illegal
[Tibetan] delegation’ would be considered ‘entertaining
109
hostile intentions against the Chinese People’s Republic.’”
(It is no coincidence that today the Chinese government
employs virtually identical threats and language to
dissuade nations from receiving governmental delegations
from the Republic of China (Taiwan) or from receiving the
Dalai Lama “officially.”)110
Similar requests communicated directly by the Kashag to
India, Nepal, and the United States generated virtually
identical “polite but negative” replies.111
All three
governments agreed that supporting Tibet’s bid would
“provoke” China; that “it was politically and logistically
impossible”; and—in retrospect, naïvely—that “if unprovoked, [China] might be content to maintain Tibet’s
traditional autonomy.”112 The United States, the nation in
which the Kashag placed its greatest hope after Britain’s
lasseiz-faire attitude became clear, therefore refused to take
the lead in supporting Tibet’s plea to the United Nations.
United States Ambassador Lloyd Henderson informed the
Tibetan government’s representative in New Delhi that
Tibet’s request for admission to the United Nations would
certainly be vetoed by China and Russia. And it might
107

See id.
See id.
109
AVEDON, supra note 90, at 27.
110
The Chinese government therefore viewed President Bush’s formal meeting
with the Dalai Lama in May 2001 as a hostile act. E.g., Feng Qihua, Dalai’s U.S.
Tour Strains Ties, CHINA DAILY, May 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7482427. Had
it not been for China’s anxiety about U.S. support for Beijing’s 2008 Olympics bid,
this may well have provoked a more serious response from the Chinese government.
111
See AVEDON, supra note 90, at 27.
112
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 44.
108
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“‘serve to precipitate Chinese Communist action to gain
control [of] Tibet.’”113 India, finally, not only refused to
champion Tibet’s cause at the United Nations, but also
made clear that, should China carry out its threatened
invasion, the Tibetan government should expect no military
114
assistance.
India’s position, above all, proved dispositive of Tibet’s
early efforts to secure political recognition. Both the United
States and Britain remained sympathetic to Tibet. After
China did invade, each expressed willingness to support
Tibet’s appeal to the General Assembly. But both nations
continued to feel obliged to defer to India, which they
viewed as the nation with the most at stake in any
resolution of Tibet’s legal status. And India suffered from
the naïve belief that “support for China over other issues,”
coupled with refusal to formally recognize Tibet, would
“prevent[] China from directly antagonising India by
invading Tibet.”115
The Korean War exacerbated this
pattern, and it continued after China invaded Tibet in 1950.
In effect, these events precluded any meaningful discourse
on Tibet’s legal status at the United Nations.
2. Appeal to the United Nations

The victory of Mao Zedong’s PLA over the KMT initiated
a resurgence of Chinese nationalism, manifest in a fervor to
“liberate” China from “foreign elements” by annexing the
diverse territories and peoples that had, to varying degrees,
been loosely incorporated into some ancient “Chinese”116
empires (most recently, that of the Manchu Dynasty).
China scholar John King Fairbank notes that, ironically,
“the [communist] revolution, which brought a sort of self113

IX FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FAR EAST; CHINA 1096.
See GYATSO, supra note 92, at 61.
115
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 26.
116
It is worth noting that these empires—the Mongol and Manchu dynasties—
were not, in fact, Chinese at all.
114
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determination to the Chinese people, kept them in a
colonialist-imperialist posture toward the adjoining peoples
of Tibet, Sinkiang [East Turkestan], and Mongolia.”117 On
October 25, 1950, China announced its intention to
“liberate” Tibet from “imperialist oppression.”118 Twelve
days later, the Tibetan government cabled its final appeal
as a sovereign state to the United Nations:
The attention of the world is riveted on Korea, where
aggression is being resisted by an international force.
Similar happenings in remote Tibet are passing
without notice. . . . We can assure you, Mr. SecretaryGeneral, that Tibet will not go down without a fight,
though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to
peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men
trained to war, but we understand that the United
Nations has decided to stop aggression whenever it
takes place. The armed invasion of Tibet for the
incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through
sheer physical force is a clear case of aggression. . . .
The problem is simple. The Chinese claim Tibet as a
part of China. Tibetans feel that racially, culturally,
and geographically they are far apart from the
Chinese. If the Chinese find the reactions of the
Tibetans to their unnatural claim not acceptable, there
are other civilized methods by which they could
ascertain the views of the people of Tibet; or, should
the issue be surely juridical, they are open to seek
119
redress in an international court of law. . . .

117

JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION 1800-1985, at 10
(1986).
118
AVEDON, supra note 90, at 32 (quoting Radio Peking, Oct. 25, 1950). In
response to India’s protestation, China maintained that “‘the problem of Tibet is
entirely the domestic problem of China. No foreign interference will be tolerated.’”
Id.
119
Cablegram from the Kashag and the National Assembly of Tibet to the United
Nations, Nov. 11, 1950, U.N. Doc. A/1549 (1950), reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG,
supra note 85, at 334.
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The Kashag’s cable attempted to impress upon the United
Nations three critical points. First, by linking Tibet’s
circumstances to those in Korea, the Tibetan government
sought to indicate that Tibet, like Korea, constituted an
independent state threatened by foreign invasion.120
Second, by emphasizing the racial, cultural, and geographic
differences between the Chinese and Tibetan peoples—and
by recounting a series of historical divides between China
and Tibet (omitted from the excerpt above)—the Kashag
invoked the “self-determination of peoples,” a diplomatic
legacy of former President Wilson,121 which would
122
subsequently be codified and applied to virtually every
colony except Tibet.
Third, the Tibetan government
appealed to the newly established provision barring the
threat or use of force in international relations. The
Kashag’s cable thus represents one of the first attempts to
invoke the principle of non-aggression codified in article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter.123 The latter two principles now
constitute axioms of international law, even if neither
receives consistent respect in practice. But in 1950, at the
outset of the Cold War, political expediency carried far
greater force than either principle. Tibet’s appeal was
promptly tabled.
Above all, Tibet faced problems generated by its
isolationist history: Few government officials knew of
Tibet’s existence, let alone its legal status.124 In fact, officials
at the U.N. Secretariat thought the Kashag’s appeal came
from a non-governmental organization.
Absent
120

See SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 52.
E.g., Speech of Woodrow Wilson, (Feb. 11, 1918), in 1 WOODROW WILSON,
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, & PUBLIC PAPERS, 1917-1924, at 117 (R.S.
Baker & W.E. Dodd eds., 1927); Michla Pmerance, The United States and SelfDetermination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1976);
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (1990).
122
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 1.
123
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state . . . .”).
124
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 53.
121
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intervention by the British delegate, who explained Tibet’s
circumstances in general terms, the Secretariat would have
recorded the appeal “on the routine list of communications
from non-governmental organisations” and dismissed it.125
But Britain thereafter refused to seize the initiative. It
chose to continue its post-colonial policy of deference to
India on all matters concerning Tibet.126 And the U.S. State
Department followed suit. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
informed Indian Prime Minister Nehru that the United
States would support India’s position on Tibet, and he
instructed the U.S. delegation not to raise the “Tibet issue”
on its own initiative.127 India then fell back upon its
customary position. Its U.N. delegate explained that
[i]n the latest note received by his Government, the
Peking Government had declared that it had not
abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties [i.e.,
China’s occupation of Tibet] by peaceful means. . . .
[S]uch a settlement could safeguard the autonomy
which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while
128
maintaining its historical association with China.

But by this time, the Indian delegate’s implication that
“Tibet and China were willing to settle the dispute
peacefully” was simply false. The Indian delegate knew full
well that the Kashag had not decided to negotiate with
China.129
India’s motivation, as before, was to avoid

125

Id.
See id. at 54. Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the British Delegation wrote candidly,
“What we want to do is to create a situation which does not oblige us in practice to
do anything about the Communist invasion of Tibet.” Id. at 55.
127
Id.
128
U.N. GAOR General Committee, 5th Sess., 73d mtg., (1950) (statement of the
delegate of India), reprinted in INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 46
(quoting U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 812th mtg, U.N. Doc. A/PV.812, para. 124) (1959).
129
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 58.
126
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antagonizing China. Any action it took on Tibet could
jeopardize its role in mediating the Korean conflict.130
El Salvador ultimately proved the unlikely but sole
proponent of Tibet’s appeal. Hecto David Castro, the
Salvadoran delegate, noted that Tibet had enjoyed genuine
independence since at least 1912. China’s actions therefore
constituted unprovoked aggression against a sovereign
state in violation of the U.N. Charter. Castro submitted a
resolution to this effect for immediate action.131 But several
factors prevented its consideration. First, the Korean War
dominated the General Assembly’s agenda.132
Second,
Russian delegate K.J. Malik urged adjournment of the
debate because in his view Tibet remained exclusively
within China’s “domestic jurisdiction.” Third, and again
dispositively, the governments of Britain and the United
States deferred to the Indian delegate’s (false)
representation that peaceful settlement negotiations were
in progress, which might obviate the need to consider the
Sino-Tibetan conflict. The “General Committee [therefore]
unanimously decided to postpone sine die consideration of
[Castro’s] draft resolution to the General Assembly.”133
After learning this, the disheartened Tibetan government
immediately transmitted a second cable to the Secretary
General inviting the United Nations to send a fact-finding
134
mission to Tibet to investigate for itself, but to no avail.
130

See id. at 60 (quoting a communication from the Government of India [GOI]
stating that “if GOI should press the Tibetan case just now in the U.N., Communist
China would be alienated to such an extent [that] GOI would lose all ameliorating
influence on Peiping [Beijing] re: Korea and related problems”).
131
See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 145; see also SHAKYA, supra note
88, at 56.
132
The General Assembly had recently “confirmed that Chinese forces had
intervened in Korea,” and on the day Tibet’s appeal arrived, General MacArthur
launched a massive offensive in Korea. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 145.
See also SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 56.
133
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 57.
134
See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 146 (citing Note by Secretary
General Communicating Text of Cablegram, dated Dec. 8, 1950, from the Tibetan
Delegation, G.A. Doc. A/1658 (1950)).
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The United States, whose interest in Tibet at that time
remained largely a product of its then-prevailing national
neurosis about the spread of communism, later struggled to
find a way to raise the issue. But it continued to decline to
seize the initiative itself. And before it could mobilize
alternative support for Tibet, a delegation that the Dalai
Lama had reluctantly sent to Beijing to negotiate with
China signed the so-called 17-Point Agreement, which
purported to “reunite” Tibet with the Chinese
“Motherland.”135
B. Tibet’s Status: An Analysis of Tibet’s Right to Legal

Recognition
136
Avedon
“On the basis of the 17-Point Agreement,”
wrote, “Tibet lost its identity as a nation-state.”137
Undoubtedly, Tibet did lose its de facto independence after
the invasion. Under international law, however, neither
China’s military conquest nor the 17-Point Agreement could
deprive Tibet of de jure statehood. The legal criteria
reviewed in Part I support the inference that Tibet was—
and remains—independent. If the series of events by which
Tibet allegedly lost its independence occurred today, we
would be hard pressed to distinguish them from Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait or Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor.
While military action against China on this basis would
clearly be destructive, neither is it constructive to continue
to indulge the fiction that Tibet’s post-War history renders

135

See Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951, P.R.C.Tibet, para. 1 [hereinafter 17-Point Agreement], reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG,
supra note 85, at 337.
136
The 17-Point Agreement purports to leave Tibet’s existing political system
intact and to preserve the “established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai
Lama.” See id. para. 4. But paragraph 14 surrenders foreign affairs control to
China; and, in practice, internal affairs, as the Dalai Lama recalled shortly after
arriving in exile, remained, at best, under the Tibetan government’s nominal
authority. See GYATSO, supra note 92, at 95-96.
137
AVEDON, supra note 90, at 36.
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it a “part of” China. Indeed, in Tibet’s case, among others,
such an ongoing act of formal recognition enables a
“violation[] of international law . . . to create rights in
international law.”138
1.

Tibet’s Status at the Time of the China’s Invasion

The precise nature of Tibet’s historical relationship with
139
But all
China remains contentious and complicated.
politically independent analysts agree that from 1913 to
1950 Tibet enjoyed de facto independence and statehood.140
The International Commission of Jurists carried out
extensive investigations of Tibet’s legal status and human
rights conditions in 1959, 1960, and 1997. It concluded that
before the invasion “Tibet had achieved de facto
independence and all of the requirements of de jure
141
independence except formal international recognition.”
Tsering Shakya notes that on “the eve of the Chinese
invasion in October 1950, the Tibetan Government
exercised internal and external freedom, which clearly
demonstrated the country’s independence.”142 Michael C.
van Walt van Praag, whose 1987 study provides an
exhaustive, hermetic analysis of Tibet’s international legal
status, concludes that the existence of the Tibetan State
was “largely uninterrupted” throughout history and
indisputably established between 1911 and October 1950.143
Historian Melvyn C. Goldstein, criticized in some circles as
too sympathetic to China’s occupation of Tibet, nonetheless
affirms, after noting the odd structure of the traditional
138

ROTH, supra note 16, at 125.
For a comprehensive historical treatment of Tibet’s political and legal status,
see sources cited infra note 143.
140
See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 140 (“Few scholars seriously
challenge the notion that Tibet possessed actual independence at least between 1911
and 1950.”) (emphasis added).
141
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 43.
142
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at xxiv.
143
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 141.
139
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Tibetan government, that “[t]his, however, does not imply
that the central government [i.e., the Dalai Lama, the
Kashag, and the National Assembly] did not exercise
authority over the entire country; it did.”144
Without unnecessarily reiterating the analyses of these
and other scholars, it is worth noting that their
observations find support in the traditional legal principles
for determining the existence of statehood enunciated above
in Part I:
Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of
statehood as generally accepted under international
law. In 1950 there was a people and a territory, and a
government which functioned in that territory,
conducting its own domestic affairs free from any
outside authority. From 1913-1950 foreign relations of
Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of
Tibet and countries with whom Tibet had foreign
relations are shown by official documents to have
145
treated Tibet in practice as an independent state.

The sole factor evincing statehood that Tibet lacked during
this period was “formal international recognition,”146
144

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85, at 6. See also LEE FEIGON, DEMISTIFYING TIBET
(1998); WARREN SMITH, TIBETAN NATION (1996); CONFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAWYERS ON ISSUES RELATING TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE FOR
TIBET, TIBET: THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993); Dawa Norbu,
Selfdetermination in the Post-Soviet Era: A Case Study of Tibet, 34 J. INT’L L. STUD.
237 (1997) (all reaching the same general conclusion—that Tibet constituted an
independent state at a minimum from 1913 to 1950). But see INFORMATION OFFICE
OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TIBET—ITS
OWNERSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (Sept. 1992), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/6.html (explaining China’s official
position, which, to my knowledge, no independent historical or legal scholar shares).
145
LEGAL INQUIRY COMMITTEE ON TIBET, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JURISTS, TIBET & THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 5-6 (1960). It is also worth
noting that Tibet possessed a unique legal system, independent from that of China.
See REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF
BUDDHIST TIBET (1999).
146
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 43.
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meaning political recognition. As an initial matter, recall
that the declaratory model of statehood does not recognize
this as a relevant factor at all; and under the constitutivist
model, political recognition, while crucial, remains a highly
ambiguous criterion.
Even under the constituvist model, however, the State of
Tibet probably received enough political recognition to
satisfy this criterion. Despite the paucity of formal acts of
recognition it received, Tibet had the capacity to, and did,
enter into foreign relations with other states, as evinced by
147
And despite
treaties that it concluded with them.
reluctance to raise the Tibet issue publicly at the General
Assembly, both Great Britain and the United States
147

E.g., Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet, arts. 1-2, July 3,
1914, arts. 1-2, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at App. 19 (Simla
Convention) (recognizing that Tibet remains under the “suzerainty” of China in
Tibet, but affirming that it shall “remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at
Lhasa” and that “[t]he Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a
Chinese province”); Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Government of
Mongolia and Tibet, Dec. 29, 1912, Mong.-Tibet, arts. 1-3, reprinted in VAN WALT
VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at App. 17 (1987) (mutually recognizing each other’s
formal independence and resolving to cooperate in matter of defense and the
preservation of the Buddhist faith); Convention Between Great Britain and Thibet,
Sept. 7, 1904, Gr. Brit.-Tibet, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at
App. 10 (1987) (resolving trade disputes between Great Britain and Tibet, albeit in a
characteristically colonial “treaty”); Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet, Mar. 1856,
Nepal-Tibet, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at App. 5 (1987);
Peace Treaty Between Ladakh and Tibet at Tingmosgang (1684). Most troubling for
China’s claim that Tibet always has been a part of China is the Sino-Tibetan treaty
of 821/823 A.D., which states that:
Both Tibet and China shall keep the country and frontiers of which they are
now in possession. The whole region to the east of that being the country of
Great Tibet, from either side of that frontier there shall be no warfare, no
hostile invasions, and no seizure of territory . . . . And in order that this
agreement establishing a great era when Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet
and Chinese shall be happy in China shall never be changed, the Three
Jewels, the body of saints, the sun and moon, planets and starts have been
invoked as witnesses . . . .
Sino-Tibetan Treaty, 821/823 A.D., China-Tibet, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG,
supra note 85, at App. 2 (1987) (emphasis added). Ironically, a pillar memorializing
the Sino-Tibetan treaty and containing this precise inscription remains standing in
the Barkhor Square in central Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. The foregoing treaties are also
available at http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/index/treaties.

SLOANE.DOC

2002]

2/9/2005 2:00 PM

A CASE STUDY OF TIBET

149

privately
affirmed
Tibet’s
statehood. A
1950
communication from the British Foreign Office, deliberately
kept confidential at the time, concluded that “since Tibet
has from 1913 not only enjoyed full control over her
internal affairs but also has maintained direct relations on
her own account with other States, she must be regarded as
a State to which Article 35(2) of the U.N. Charter
applies . . . .”148 The U.S. State Department, in a similar
confidential communication to Britain, wrote:
The United States, which was one of the early
supporters of the principle of self-determination of
peoples, believes that the Tibetan people has the same
inherent right as any other to have the determining
voice in its political destiny . . . .
[S]hould
developments warrant, consideration could be given to
149
recognition of Tibet as an independent State.

In fact, while U.S. Ambassador Lloyd W. Henderson
complied with the official American policy of deference to
India, he asked then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “Is it
logical for [the] U.N. which gave Indonesia which was
under Dutch sovereignty, [a] hearing to ignore Tibet?”150
Finally, Tibet’s lack of significant political recognition
prior to 1950 is not a function of any inherent deficiency as
a nation-state. Rather, it resulted from the misguided
isolationist policies pursued by the Tibetan government
during the pre-War era. For this reason, most states never
had occasion to consider Tibet’s status. It is therefore
neither conclusive nor even particularly informative to note
that few declared formal views on the matter. If they had
148

British Foreign Office, 371-84454 (1950), reprinted in SHAKYA, supra note 91,

at 54.
149

Aide-Memoire from the U.S. Department of State to the British Embassy (Dec.
30, 1950), reprinted in 6 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 613 (1950).
150
Letter from Lloyd W. Henderson, U.S. Ambassador to the Secretary of State
(Dec. 30, 1950), reprinted in 6 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 612
(1950).
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had occasion to consider Tibet’s status, it would have been
apparent that Tibet—one of the few Asian nations never to
be colonized by a European imperial power151—maintained
as much, if not more, of a legitimate claim to statehood than
those territories that, in the post-War era of decolonization,
began to receive formal recognition as states. Given the
critical role of state practice on the international law of
recognition vis-à-vis former colonies and non-self-governing
territories, it bears emphasizing that few, if any, states
maintained, at that time, that putative states—for example,
the Belgian Congo, the Dutch East Indies, or the colonies of
French equatorial-Africa—did not merit statehood because
they lacked statehood or formal recognition in the past.
Indeed, whereas many states born in the post-War era
share little more than a common history of colonial
exploitation, Tibet’s national polis shares religious,
linguistic, racial, cultural, historical, and political bonds
dating back millennia, the very factors traditionally
constitutive of a “people”152 with a distinct national
identity.153 Ironically, at the very time in history when
151

Great Britain enjoyed considerable trading privileges in Tibet during the turn
of the century, but it never colonized Tibet, as it did neighboring India, nor did it
purport to supplant Tibet’s government.
152
In 1990, the United Nations Economic and Social Cooperation Organization
(UNESCO) defined a “people” in terms of the following “objective” factors:
1. (a) a common historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural
homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial
connection; (g) a common economic life. 2. The group must be of a certain number
which need not be large (e.g., the people of micro states), but which must be more
than a mere association of individuals within a state . . . . 4. The group must have
institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for
identity.”
International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of Peoples,
UNESCO, Paris, SHS. 89/ CONF. 602/7 (1990). The Tibetan people satisfy each of
these criteria. Norbu, supra note 85, at 254-63.
153
The salience of these factors is apparent to Tibetans. Tsering Shakya, in the
introduction to the autobiography of former Tibetan political prisoner Palden
Gyatso, captures this point well:
Academics and lawyers can produce persuasive arguments to demonstrate
that Tibet was always independent or that it was always a part of China,
but for people like Palden and for hundreds of ordinary Tibetans, the finer
points of international diplomacy and the canons of international law have
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Europe began to promote decolonization and extend the
right to self-determination to formerly subjugated peoples,
these same states declined to consider the appeal of an
extant state being colonized.
2. The Effect of China’s Military Occupation of Tibet

A state established under international law continues to
exist “unless and until the source or validity of [its]
government has indisputably been transferred . . . to the
government of another State.”154 Before the mid-nineteenth
century, military conquest remained a valid method of
acquiring territory and transferring its sovereignty to the
155
conquering government. But the propriety of this method
has now been decisively repudiated.156 Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter establishes that member states shall “refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”157 On October 24, 1970, the
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2625, which
proclaims that “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from
the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.”158 In
his most recent treatise, Brownlie states without
qualification that “illegal occupation cannot of itself

never been particularly relevant.
Palden is convinced of Tibet’s
separateness and independence because that is his common experience.
The two countries are separated by tradition, culture, language and history.
For him, that is a fact as clear as the difference between milk and water.
Tsering Shakya, Preface to PALDEN GYATSO, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A TIBETAN
MONK (1997); see also SMITH, supra note 85, at 360-61 (noting that “Tibet was
unique among the frontier territories the CCP attempted to integrate into the
Chinese state . . . Tibetans were united by a cultural and religious identity and a
primarily latent but autochthonous nationalist consciousness”).
154
BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 177.
155
See id. at 178.
156
See generally KORMAN, supra note 69, at 218-34.
157
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
158
G.A. Res. (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
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terminate statehood.”159
Finally, even assuming that
military conquest remains, under exigent circumstances, a
legitimate means of acquiring sovereignty over a formerly
independent state, China itself does not acknowledge the
validity of this method; nor does it invoke this theory in
support of its “ownership” of Tibet.160 If Tibet lost its right
to recognition as a state in 1950, it was thus not because of
the Chinese invasion. The other possibility is the 17-Point
Agreement.
3. The Status of the 17-Point Agreement Under International
Law

After its failure to secure consideration by the United
Nations and under growing military pressure, the Tibetan
government sent delegates to Beijing to negotiate. The
delegates repudiated then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s
initial proposal because it described Tibet as an integral
part of China. But under duress that included threats of
“both personal violence and large-scale military retaliation
against Tibet,”161 the twenty-three delegates, acting without
the authority or approval of the Tibetan government, signed
the 17-Point Agreement. This treaty purported to “reunite”
Tibet with the Chinese “Motherland.” To date, China “does
not itself recognize conquest, annexation, or prescription as
modes of valid territorial acquisition and, furthermore, . . .
has never claimed to have acquired title to Tibet through
any of these modes.”162 But in view of Tibet’s statehood in
1950, neither could China have acquired sovereignty by
159

BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 78. For this same reason, “[i]t is not correct to
describe governments-in-exile as states without people or territory when the
displacement is caused by a belligerent occupation.” Id. at 78 n.56.
160
See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 188 (noting that the Chinese
government has never claimed title to Tibet in virtue of its military occupation but
has instead advanced as justification its “prior possession of a legal title,” based on a
highly questionable history of Sino-Tibetan political relations).
161
AVEDON, supra note 90, at 35.
162
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 188.
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means of the 17-Point Agreement.
A review of the
customary international law of treaties belies this
contention.
As a preliminary matter, it is revealing to note that China
felt the need to enter into a treaty—a state-to-state
“contract”—with an entity that it claims was never an
independent state with the capacity to contract. In any
event the 17-Point Agreement does not represent a valid
transfer of Tibet’s sovereignty to China. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
expressions of state consent “procured by the coercion of its
representative through acts or threats directed against
him” or “by the threat or use of force” shall be void and
163
The Convention was not in
“without any legal effect.”
force when the Chinese government coerced the Tibetan
delegates in Beijing to sign the 17-Point Agreement. But
its terms represent a codification of the customary
international law of treaties.164 The threats directed against
Tibet’s delegates to compel them to sign the 17-Point
Agreement therefore render it void and without legal effect.
The Tibetan government arguably acceded to the treaty by
subsequently abiding by its terms. But van Walt van Praag
clarifies that:
the state of coercion by which the treaty was imposed
continued [until the Dalai Lama’s exile in 1959]. . . .
[T]he Dalai Lama and his government were at no time
in a position to freely express their acceptance or
165
rejection of the terms of the 17-Point Agreement.

163

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 51-52,
reprinted at 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
164
See id. at preamble (observing that “principles of free consent and of good
faith . . . are universally recognized,” and describing the Vienna Convention as a
“codification . . . of the law of treaties”).
165
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 165.
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Furthermore, de facto enforcement of a treaty does not
validate its de jure illegality.166 Moreover, during the Dalai
Lama’s flight into exile in March 1959, while still in
Tibetan territory, he formally repudiated the 17-Point
Agreement.167
Absent a specific provision relating to withdrawal,
international law does not generally permit unilateral
168
But the
denunciation to nullify treaty obligations.
Tibetan government’s repudiation proves justified here
because of breach.169 By 1959, China had abrogated the 17Point Agreement by, inter alia, undermining the integrity of
the local government, restricting religious freedom, altering
the status and powers of the Dalai Lama, and, most
egregiously, bombarding Lhasa and massacring the Tibetan
people on March 10, 1959. In view of these violations, “the
Government of Tibet was entitled to repudiate the
170
The 17-Point Agreement of
agreement as it did in 1959.”
1951 was therefore “null and void ab initio, leaving the
legal independence of Tibet intact at the time of its
conclusion”171 and abrogated by China, precluding its
present invocation to establish Chinese sovereignty over
Tibet.
In sum, neither Tibet’s military conquest by China nor
the 17-Point Agreement altered Tibet’s legal status as of
1950. Tibet remains, according to the international legal
criteria for recognition, a nation-state under illegal foreign
occupation.
And “Tibetans are a ‘people under alien
166

See FAIRBORZ NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (1971).
TENZIN GYATSO, FREEDOM IN EXILE 141 (1990).
168
See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 621.
169
See id. at 622 (observing that “material breach by one party entitles the other
party or parties to a treaty to invoke the breach as the ground of termination or
suspension”). See also Vienna Convention, art. 60(1), supra note 162, reprinted at 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (“A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or
suspending its operation in whole or in part.”).
170
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 21.
171
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 165.
167
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subjugation,’ entitled under international law to the right of
self-determination, by which they freely determine their
political status.”172
C. The Force of Popular Moral Opinion: Manifestations of Civil
Recognition

One commentator has noted that “[o]nce history’s stage
was peopled with kings and princes. Now it seems that
almost anyone with letterhead stationary and a tax
identification number can crowd on as well.”173
Civil
recognition practices embrace a vast array of international
actors.
These include nongovernmental organizations,
scholars, popular media, and individually elected
government officials whose actions and views, though not
binding state practice, still serve as a powerful mouthpiece
for their constituency’s popular moral opinion.
The
dramatic increase in these practices invites inquiry into
what influence, if any, they can or should exert on the
evolution of international norms of recognition in the
modern world order.
Non-sovereign actors, particularly nongovernmental and
transnational institutions, can help to resolve difficulties
that states alone possess neither the resources nor the
174
But hortatory proclamations,
political will to tackle.
academic writing, and advisory roles in international
institutions do not effect direct changes in international
law. On the whole, these actors can effect change only by
influencing governments.175 Even transnational bodies,
which often prove more efficacious because they enjoy a
foundation in treaty law and influential relations with their
172

INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 21.
Paul Lewis, Not Just Governments Make War or Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1998, at B9.
174
See id. (noting the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines,
initiated by Nobel Peace Prize-winner Jodi Williams).
175
See id. (quoting Owen Harris).
173
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constituent sovereigns, can only enact change to the extent
that the states that comprise them genuinely pursue the
policies they promote or—in rare cases—prescribe.
But precisely because their influence on states has
increased in the post-War era, civil recognition practices
merit appraisal in the context of the complex and
multifaceted nature of the modern international law of
recognition.
Today,
“[m]ultilateral
organizations,
transgovermental channels between agencies charged with
similar tasks, contacts with state-owned enterprises or
trade bodies, and various sorts of informal envoys all
provide alternatives to diplomatic missions, as do the
services of third parties.”176 Tibet provides insight into the
growing influence of civil recognition. For many reasons—
some admirable, some superficial—scholars, transnational
institutions, NGOs, popular media, and individually elected
governmental representatives have been attracted to the
“Tibet issue” in recent years; and their influence has not
been negligible.
1. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

In 1987 and 1989, the Chinese military brutally
suppressed a series of peaceful pro-independence
demonstrations in Lhasa.177 Shortly thereafter, the NGO
community of Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) proliferated
rapidly. In May 2000, more than 300 delegates from fiftytwo countries worldwide established the International Tibet
Support Network (ITSN). ITSN comprises more than “100
organizational members from all Asia, Europe, the
Americas and Africa.”178 Some of its members support full
176

Peterson, supra note 53, at 48.
For an account of these events and their aftermath, see generally TIBET
INFORMATION NETWORK & LAW ASIA ASSOCIATION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
DEFYING THE DRAGON: CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIBET (1991).
178
International
Tibet
Support
Network,
About
ITSN,
at
http://www.tibet.org/itsn/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
177

SLOANE.DOC

2002]

2/9/2005 2:00 PM

A CASE STUDY OF TIBET

157

independence for Tibet; others focus specifically on human
rights, environmental exploitation, education, healthcare,
or other humanitarian concerns. To be sure, the TSG
community does not speak with one voice.179 But they share
a common conviction: China’s occupation of Tibet fails to
respect the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination and
causes severe human rights and environmental abuses, as
well as social, economic, and cultural decay.180 For this
reason, many TSGs increasingly express a growing
consensus that unless and until China permits the Tibetan
people to exercise their right to self-determination, the
negative consequences of its occupation of Tibet will
continue.181
NGOs not specifically devoted to Tibet also do not speak
univocally.
The Unrepresented Nations and People’s
Organization (UNPO), not surprisingly, shares the TSG
view that Tibet is a state under colonial occupation by
China.182 Human Rights Watch, by contrast, refuses—as a
matter of its corporate mandate and concerns about its
institutional integrity—to take any stand on the issue of
179

For example, compare the position of Students for a Free Tibet, which tends to
take a more hard-line, pro-independence stance, with that of the International
Campaign for Tibet, which tends to focus on initiating negotiations between Beijing
and the Tibetan government-in-exile to promote some kind of “genuine autonomy”
arrangement for Tibet.
See Students for a Free Tibet, Why Tibet?, at
http://www.tibet.org/sft/tibet.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); International Campaign
for Tibet, About ICT: Mission, at http://www.savetibet.org/About/AboutList.cfm?c=2
(last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
180
E.g., INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that economic
issues, assaults on Tibetan culture, human rights abuses, and political difficulties all
“flow from the denial of the Tibetan people’s most fundamental right—to exercise
self-determination”).
181
E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF LAWYERS FOR TIBET, A GENERATION IN
PERIL: THE LIVES OF TIBETAN CHILDREN UNDER CHINESE RULE 111 (2001)
(concluding that violations of Tibetan children’s rights in the areas of political rights,
education, healthcare, and nutrition, while amenable to improvement by specific
recommendations, are “unlikely to cease until the Chinese government returns
responsibility for the welfare of Tibetan children to their parents—and to a
government based upon an act of self-determination by the Tibetan people”).
182
See UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATION: YEARBOOK 1997,
“CHINA’S TIBET”: THE WORLD’S LARGEST REMAINING COLONY 40-48 (1997).
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Tibet’s status or the legitimacy of its government-in-exile:183
This is a “political” issue, not a “human rights” issue.
Amnesty International, similarly, avoids taking an express
stance on this issue. It, too, fears being perceived as, not an
impartial human rights advocate, but an NGO with a
“political persuasion.”184 The irony—indeed, hypocrisy—of
this position is that self-determination is a human right.185
Institutional reluctance to acknowledge this may be
understandable, first, because the meaning of selfdetermination remains highly contentious;186 and second,
because the efficacy of NGOs—their ability to carry out
their essential activities (monitoring and advocacy)—
depends to an appreciable degree on their international
perception as apolitical.
But recognition that China
continues to violate the Tibetan people’s human right to
self-determination need not imply a particular stance on
Tibet’s right to recognition as a state under international
law. It may counsel a more moderate position, such as
encouraging China to permit the Tibetan people to
participate in an internationally-supervised referendum on
their political status, as the International Commission of
Jurists in fact recommended.187 Indeed, at the recent U.N.
World Conference Against Racism, the first U.N. conference
at which Tibetan NGOs and government-in-exile
representatives
succeeded—over
China’s
vehement
objection—in obtaining accreditation, the NGO forum
denounced the “colonial occupation of Tibet” and called for
an internationally monitored referendum in Tibet.188
183

See, e.g., Mickey Spiegel, China and Tibet: Profiles of Tibetan Exiles, 11
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2 n.1 (1999); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA & TIBET
INFORMATION NETWORK, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.
184
See Amnesty International, About Amnesty, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/
web/aboutai.nsf (last visited Jan. 24, 2002); Statute of Amnesty International (as
amended, 23d Int’l Council Meeting, Cape Town, South Africa, Dec. 19, 1997),
available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/aboutai.nsf/.
185
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 1.
186
See generally Fox, supra note 3.
187
See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 24.
188
See NGO Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference Against
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2. Legal and Historical Scholarship

Politically independent legal and historical scholars agree
at a minimum that Tibet indisputably established its
statehood between 1913 and 1950; and that events after
this period did not alter this status validly. But scholars
have not called on governments to extend Tibet the formal
recognition that their writings suggest it merits; indeed,
one commentator specifically disavowed this position.189
The historian Lee Feigon writes only that understanding
Tibet’s status may serve to “demolish myths not only about
Tibet but also about China, especially the notion that China
has always been the zhongguo or “Central Kingdom” to the
various cultures and peoples in the region,” particularly
“[b]efore the emergence of the modern nation states . . . .”190
Like NGOs outside the TSG community, the failure of legal
and historical scholars to take an explicit stance on Tibet’s
Racism, ¶¶ 101-03 & 65-66, Sept. 2, 2001.
189
See W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tienamen: Chinese Human Rights and the United
States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575, 1611-12 (1989) (describing
congressional activity indicating support for Tibet’s formal recognition as an
“attempted usurpation of presidential powers” that “directly contravened all other
congressional and executive acts in the continuous pattern of recognition of China
for more than a decade.”). Vause argues that “[i]nvolvement in the separatist
movement . . . and the political programs advocated by the Dalai Lama, are not
legitimate roles for Congress.” Id. at 1613. Characterizing Tibet’s independence
movement as “separatist,” as does China, reflects an odd position in view of the
uniform view of scholars that Tibet remains an independent state under illegal
foreign occupation.
190
LEE FEIGON, Foreword, DEMISTYIFYING TIBET, at x-xi (1996). The roots of this
misconception date to the early twentieth century, when Sun Yat-Sen elaborated the
Min Ts’u doctrine (“doctrine of the national group”). E.g., Sun Yat-Sen, Lecture
(Jan. 27, 1924), in SUN YAT-SEN: HIS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALS 163 (Leonard
Shihlien Hsü trans. & ed. 1933). Chiang Kai-Shek, Sun’s sucessor, perpetuated and
expanded this doctrine in China’s Destiny, in which he argued that Tibetans,
Mongols, Manchus, and other “national minorities” constituted racial “stocks” within
the Chinese national group. See CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA’S DESTINY 10-14 (1947).
Mao, in turn, co-opted this stance within his communist vision of a unified
proletariat; he conceived of “minority” nationalism as yet another manifestation of
Marxist “false consciousness.” E.g., Mao Tse-Tung, The Relationship Between the
Han Nationality and the Minority Nationality, in V SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG 38-40 (Pergamon Press trans. & ed. 1977); see generally SMITH, supra note 85,
at 332-39 (discussing the genesis of Mao’s conception of nationalism).
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right to recognition as a state reflects awareness of their
institutional role and perhaps also concern about its
integrity: Scholarship, generally speaking, should avoid
polemics. Despite this reluctance, insofar as scholarship
reflects civil recognition, its implications for Tibet’s right to
recognition are largely uniform. Like NGOs, the academic
community agrees, at a minimum, that Tibetans are a
“people” and that China has failed to extend them the right
to self-determination.
3. Civil Society

Expressions of civil society’s popular sentiments take
diverse forms: demonstrations, films, fiction, and editorials,
to name a few of the most visible. For Tibet, these forms of
popular support have proved one of the most remarkable,
unique, and efficacious factors that animate calls for the
Tibetan people’s right to self-determination.
Annual
“Tibetan Freedom Concerts,” featuring popular musicians
such as Pearl Jam, the Beastie Boys, and David Bowie,
enjoy huge audiences in Washington, D.C., and major
European capitals; novelists select Tibet as a setting for
191
fictional narratives in order to call attention to its plight;
Hollywood produces films, such as Kundun and Seven Years
in Tibet, which, while superficially apolitical, often provoke
serious and hostile responses from Beijing.192 Indeed, a
growing number of actors, most prominently, Richard Gere,
Harrison Ford, Steven Siegel and Pierce Brosnan, have
become powerful advocates of Tibetan independence and
human rights. In August 2001, in fact, Richard Gere
191

E.g., JAMYANG NORBU, THE MANDALA OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (2000); HERGE,
TINTIN IN TIBET (1998).
192
See, e.g., Xinhua Eng. Newsletter, Article Blasts U.S. Backing Dalai’s
Separatist Activities, May 25, 2001 (summarizing Xinhua News Agency, China’s
Official Press) (“The anti-China forces with the American film industry have played
up the so-called Tibetan issues in recent years by producing such films as ‘Kundun’
and ‘Seven Years in Tibet,’ which distort facts and confuse right and wrong, the
article says.”), available at 2001 WL 21401458.
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agreed to appear in the popular cartoon series The
Simpsons on condition that the “episode include a scene
calling for the freedom of Tibet.”193
The plethora of “Tibet chic” that pervades Western society
recently led journalist and China scholar Orville Schell, Jr.
to describe a “virtual Tibet,” as manifest in popular media,
and as distinct from the “real” Tibet.194 Popular support for
the Tibetan people frequently takes the form of express civil
advocacy for Tibetan independence, a phenomenon that
Schell views as remarkable. He notes that “Free Tibet”
bumper stickers, for example, are ubiquitous, whereas
“Free Kosovo” stickers (prior to the U.N. transitional
administration that assumed power after the 1999 NATO
195
China perceives a genuine
campaign) remained rare.
threat in these manifestations of civil recognition. After the
release of Kundun, for example, the government sponsored
its own counter-Kundun to describe the “real history of the
Dalai and the Panchen Lama and Tibet.”196 Popular support
for Tibet emboldens calls for its recognition and helps to
ensure that the world does not neglect the isolated
“Shangri-la” that U.N. officials once mistook for a nongovernmental organization.
4. Support From Individual Elected Representatives

In a democratic society, civil recognition manifests itself
not only in popular media but also through individual
expressions of support from elected representatives. These
officials do not, of course, dictate state practice
193

Richard Gere to Appear in the Simpsons, ANANOVA (Aug. 11, 2001), available
at http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/2001/8/14_4.html.
194
See ORVILLE SCHELL, VIRTUAL TIBET: SEARCHING FOR SHANGRI-LA FROM THE
HIMALAYAS TO HOLLYWOOD 11 (2000).
195
See id.
196
Interview with Chime Tsomo, former Tibetan tour-guide and U.S. asylee who
witnessed the film’s production and suffered persecution for refusing to translate
information about this film to a group of Western tourists, New York, NY (Mar. 12,
2001) (on file with author).
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independently. But their advocacy and interests often
prove to be powerful forces of civil recognition that can, over
time, influence state practice. In August 1997, for example,
Congressman Frank Wolf visited Tibet covertly to see for
himself its human rights and environmental conditions.197
Wolf is now one of more than one-hundred House
cosponsors of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2001, which, inter
alia, “reaffirms that Tibet, including those Tibetan areas
incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan,
Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai, is an occupied country under
the established principles of international law.”198 In July
1999, Bob Brown, an Australian Senator from Tasmania,
undertook a similar covert fact-finding trip to Tibet.199 He
has become one of the foremost proponents of Tibetan
200
Here again, China perceives a serious
independence.
threat in these expressions of support for Tibet from
individually elected representatives, who, after all, do not
dictate state practice. 201 Free from the executive branch’s
197

Representative
Wolf’s
trip
report
is
available
on
line
at
http://www.house.gov/wolf/199789Tibet.htm.
198
Tibetan Policy Act of 2001 (TPA), § 4(1), H.R. Bill No. 1779, 107th Cong., May
9, 2001; S. Bill No. 852, § 4(1), 107th Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 2001.
199
See Australian Politician Sneaks Into Tibet, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE., July
29, 1999. Shortly after Senator Brown’s covert visit, another Australian politician,
Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives Garry Nehl, visited Tibet but this
time under the aegis of the Chinese authorities. Not surprisingly, he concluded that
Brown had been mistaken. “There were absolutely no signs of Tibet being a police
state nor of the people being oppressed.” Brendan Nicholson, Tibet Better Off Under
China: MP, THE AGE , Sept. 21, 1999, at 10 (quoting Representative Nehl). These
conflicting reports caused considerable controversy. See Michael Zekulich, MP’s
Tibet Comments ‘Outrageous’, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 21, 1999.
200
E.g., Senator Bob Brown, The Shame of Tibet Will Not Go Away, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 1999.
201
For China’s reaction to Congressman Wolf’s visit, see, for example, Joe
McDonald, China Angry Over U.S. Lawmaker’s Criticism of Tibet, AP, Aug. 24,
1997; Beijing Blasts U.S. Congressman’s Tibet Remarks as ‘Wanton Slander’,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 25, 1997. Shortly after Wolf’s clandestine visit,
Xinhua issued an English newswire “refuting” Wolf’s claims based on the claims of
alleged “Tibetologists.” Overseas Tibetologists Refute Wolf’s Remarks, XINHUA ENG.
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 2, 1997. For China’s reaction to Senator Brown’s visit, see, for
example, Chinese Anger Over Brown’s Visit to Tibet, AUSTR. BROADCAST NEWS, July
29, 1999 (quoting Chinese Ambassador to Australia Zhang’s hostile response in the
aftermath of Brown’s visit); China to ‘Check’ How Australian Politician Got Into
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need to preserve the delicate state of diplomatic relations
with China, however, these representatives often find
themselves in a position to express more candidly their
views on Tibet’s right to recognition.
The Conference of World Parliamentarians, convened at
New Delhi on March 20, 1994, issued a statement asserting
that “[t]he Chinese invasion . . .reduced Tibet, in effect, to
the status of a Chinese colony and an occupied country.”202
The U.S. Congress has passed numerous resolutions
validating Tibet’s claim to statehood and declaring it an
independent state under illegal foreign occupation.203 And
recently, the Polish assembly, the Sejm, issued a
declaration regarding “Solidarity of the Sejm of the
Republic of Poland with the Tibetan Nation,” which refers
repeatedly to Tibet as a “nation” and a “country” oppressed
by China.204

Tibet, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 30, 1999.
202
World Parliamentarians Convention on Tibet, New Delhi Statement on
Tibetan Freedom, ¶ 2, New Delhi, Mar. 20, 1994.
203
See, for example, S. Res.169, Sep. 8, 1995; see also Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title
V, § 536, 108 Stat. 481 (1994)(“Reporting Requirements on Occupied Tibet”)
(“Congress has determined that Tibet is an occupied sovereign country under
international law.”); Pub. L. 102-138, Title III, § 355, 108 Stat. 481 (“China’s Illegal
Control of Tibet”), Oct. 28, 1991 (expressing the sense of Congress that “Tibet,
including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan,
Gansu and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the established principles of
international law”).
204
Declaration of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland regarding Solidarity of the
Sejm of the Republic of Poland with the Tibetan Nation, Aug. 24, 2001, at
http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/Tybet/declarationfin.html (last visited May 1, 2002); see
also Canada Tibet Comm., World Tibet Network News: German Parliament Adopts
Tibet Resolution (Apr. 20, 2002), at http://www.tibet.ca/english/index.html (citing
Declaration of the Bundestag of Germany regarding Human Rights and
Development in Tibet, Apr. 19, 2002); Canada Tibet Comm., World Tibet Network
News: Italian Parliamentary Group for Tibet Established (May 9, 2002), at
http://www.tibet.ca/english/index.html (legislative group for Tibet charged with
preparing and submitting a draft resolution calling for “[r]ecognition of the Tibetan
Government in Exile as the real representative of the Tibetan people by
governments in the European Union, if Beijing does not grant full autonomy for
Tibet within three years”).
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5. Transnational Institutions

Transnational institutions and organizations, such as
those of the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, and the European Union, also at times reflect
popular moral sentiment. Their capacity to do this varies
depending on how much independence they enjoy from
constituent states. U.N. bodies have therefore, with one
exception, been unwilling to consider Tibet since 1965,
when the General Assembly last issued a resolution on
Tibet.205 Member states remain largely beholden to China’s
economic and political influence. By contrast, the European
Parliament, the sole directly elected representative body in
the European Union framework, consistently passes
resolutions condemning China’s occupation and human
rights violations in Tibet. Recently, these culminated in an
extraordinary resolution in which the Parliament, recalling
Tibet’s illegal invasion by China, proclaimed that if, within
three years, China continues to refuse to negotiate a
genuine autonomous status for Tibet with the Tibetan
government-in-exile, the constituent states of the European
Union should extend formal recognition to the Tibetan
government-in-exile.206 On the date of the China-European
Union Summit in Brussels, Per Gahrton, Chairman of the
European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the
People’s Republic of China, issued a statement to the
Council of Europe and the European Commission, urging
these institutions to communicate to China that “if no
solution to the Tibet issue has been implemented by June

205

G.A. Res. 2079, GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14 at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2079
(1965). See U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/37 (1992); G.A.
Res. 1353, GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1353 (1959); G.A.
Res. 1723, GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1723 (1961).
206
European Parliament Resolution on the Western China Poverty Reduction and
the Future of Tibet, ¶ 2, Tibet B5-0608, 0610, 0617, 0621 and 0641/2000, available at
http://www.tibet.ca/english/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
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2004 at the latest, the EU countries will consider
recognizing the Tibetan government in exile.”207
6. Conclusion: The Impact of Civil Recognition

It would be easy to dismiss these manifestations of civil
recognition as merely hortatory or quixotic—to note that, in
the context of international relations, they remain largely
ineffectual. But this understates their growing impact on
state practice. Absent civil recognition, for example, it is
unlikely that President Bush would have been inclined to
receive the Dalai Lama formally, a movement that
generated serious friction with China’s political elite
precisely because it implied his recognition as a head of
state. In May 2001, the House of Representatives and the
Senate concurrently introduced the Tibetan Policy Act of
2001 (TPA). This legislation, inter alia, (1) declares Tibet
an “occupied country under the established principles of
international law”; (2) institutionalizes within the State
Department the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet;
(3) mandates a reporting requirement on Tibet “whenever a
report is transmitted to the Congress on a country-bycountry basis”; and (4) instructs the executive branch to
oppose all efforts to block discussion of Tibet’s status at the
United Nations and to support the appointment of a special
rapporteur on Tibet.208
Responses to the July 6 resolution of the European
Parliament remain to be seen. It is unlikely that most
national governments will abide by its suggestion in the
near future. On the other hand, civil recognition, even if
207

Letter from Per Gahrton, Chairman, European Parliament Delegation for
Relations with the People’s Republic of China, to the Council of Europe and the
European Commission, Sept. 7, 2001.
208
TPA, S.852.IS, 107th Cong. § 4(1), 7, 6, 16 (2001). China’s response was
immediate and predictable. Its state press described the TPA as “another U.S.
maneuver to poke its nose into China’s internal affairs.” Xin Zhiming, Ignorant or
Just Arrogant, CHINA DAILY, May 14, 2001.
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incapable of producing immediate changes in state practice,
ensures that China’s continuing occupation of Tibet does
not become obscured by the passage of time. It keeps the
issue alive, such that, should internal political dynamics
within China change in the future, which is not unlikely,209
the factual predicate for recognizing Tibet’s statehood and
right to self-determination does not disappear behind a veil
of government rhetoric. The Chinese government is not
unaware of this danger. It responded vehemently to the
European Parliament’s Resolution, which according to its
state press, “deliberately called the Chinese territory [of]
210
Tibet a ‘country,’ slandering that China ‘occupied’ Tibet.”
Civil recognition practices not only manifest popular
moral sentiment; they also animate over time real actions
that influence states to change their recognition practices,
or at least, to render them somewhat more ambiguous than
they might otherwise become. It remains unlikely in the
near future that any state will formally recognize Tibet.
But civil recognition practices ensure that China’s
insistence that Tibet is part of China does not obscure
Tibet’s true legal status and its people’s right to selfdetermination. Without it, China’s ongoing struggle to
convince the world that Tibet has always been a part of
China would be far easier. Ensuring that Tibet remains, in
the perception of civil society, a state under illegal
occupation, not an “internal affair” of China, is an essential
predicate to vindicating Tibet’s claim to statehood in the
future.
III. THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE:
RECOGNITION AND CIVIL LEGITIMACY

Distinguishing recognition of governments from that of
states proves difficult because, to reiterate, “the existence of
209

See GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001).
PRC Opposes European Parliament’s Resolution on Tibet, XINHUA, July 14,
2000, available at 2000 WL 24051363.
210
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an effective and independent government is the essence of
statehood, and, significantly, recognition of states may take
the form of recognition of a government.”211 But states
without recognized governments exist (e.g., Somalia and
Burma), and similarly, governments without recognized
corresponding states—i.e., governments-in-exile—emerge
under some circumstances. Broadly speaking, governmentsin-exile are “opposition groups that struggle from outside
their territory to overthrow and replace the regime in their
independent, occupied, or claimed home country.”212 Their
formal legal status is often easy to state: none. But their
resilience as international actors invites inquiry into
whether it is useful to distinguish, as for putative states,
between the multifaceted political, legal, and civil
recognition practices of governments toward governmentsin-exile—for such entities, if and when they displace the
regime in the territories to which they aspire, may receive
political recognition. One question then becomes what
influence their legal and civil recognition in the preceding
period should exert on political recognition at that time.
The Tibetan government-in-exile, which has now existed
for more than forty years, offers unique insight into this
question. Although it still lacks political recognition, it
remains perhaps the most resilient and effective
government-in-exile in history. It also enjoys a strong claim
to legitimacy based on contemporary international norms.
To appraise its status fully, it is instructive to distinguish
again between the political, legal, and civil dimensions of
recognition practices. Because much of this discussion
would overlap with the preceding analysis of Tibet’s
statehood, however, I will not reiterate the above
observations insofar as they speak as much to the status of
Tibet’s government as they do to its statehood.
211

BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 91. See also MENON, supra note 15, at 36, 106;
PETERSON, supra note 12, at 2.
212
Yossi Shain, Introduction, Governments-in-Exile and the Age of Democratic
Transitions, in GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE, supra note 43, at 2.
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A. Political Recognition: Governing a Constituency Without a
State

Despite the European Parliament’s efforts, the Tibetan
government-in-exile’s formal recognition remains, to date,
non-existent. No government in the world recognizes the
Tibetan government-in-exile as a government. But this
observation does not end the analysis. Political recognition
practices toward the Dalai Lama’s putative government are
more complex. Many states that lack the political will
formally to recognize the Tibetan government nonetheless
extend to it humanitarian aid to assist its “nationals” and
engage its political elite in diplomatic dialogue. The United
States, for example, provides more than $100,000 annually
to assist the government-in-exile to process and care for its
growing constituency (i.e., newly arrived Tibetan refugees)
and more than $2 million in development aid to Tibetans
still residing within Chinese-occupied Tibet.213 And its chief
executive not infrequently meets with the Tibetan
government-in-exile’s head of state, the Fourteenth Dalai
Lama. States remain sensitive to offending China, but
many receive the Dalai Lama in a manner that implies this
political status. For this reason, President Bush’s official
audience with the Dalai Lama in May 2001 provoked a
more hostile response from China’s elite than former
President Clinton’s “drop by” meeting with him.
In terms of a constituency, more than 100,000 stateless
Tibetans, forced from their nation by persecution or born
and raised in Tibetan communities in India and Nepal,
view the Tibetan government-in-exile as their legitimate
political representative. Many Tibetans who remain in
Chinese-occupied Tibet also view the Dalai Lama’s
government, rather than the Chinese elite installed by
Beijing to govern the TAR, as their genuine political
213

Interview with Julia Taft, former Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Migration, and Refugees, and Special Coordinator for Tibet during the Clinton
Administration, Washington, D.C., (Apr. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
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representative. Finally, it is worth noting that the efforts of
the United States and Western Europe to convince China to
enter into negotiations with the Tibetan government-inexile imply, as they do for Taiwan, “state-to-state” relations
inconsistent with a complete absence of political
recognition.
Beyond this, little can be said. Despite these acts, no
government recognizes the Tibetan government-in-exile
formally at present. But to appraise state practice in this
regard, it is critical to recognize that the incidents of
governmental recognition, such as those noted above, and
not only the formal positions of states expressed in
diplomatic exchanges, have implications for political
recognition practices toward governments-in-exile.
B. Legal Recognition of Governments-in-Exile: Precedents and
Evolving Norms

Objective criteria to assess the Tibetan government-inexile’s right to legal recognition do not exist in international
law.
International law generally acknowledges that
“[r]ecognition [of governments], as a public act of state, is an
optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this
regard.”214 Traditionally, states remain free to recognize or
decline to recognize putative governments to further their
215
But today, this may
diplomatic objectives and ideologies.
not be strictly accurate. The United Nations and its
derivative framework have established precedents for socalled “regimes of non-recognition”:216 At times, the U.N.
214

BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 90. See also HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (1966).
215
Shain, supra note 45, at 219.
216
See, e.g., Thomas D. Grant, East Timor, the U.N. System, and Enforcing NonRecognition in International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 273, 280-96 (2000)
(reviewing “regimes of non-recognition” arguably established by the United Nations
in the post-War era); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ 16, 58 (June 21) (holding that U.N member states
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Security Council instructs states to refuse recognition to
governments that purport to exercise control over certain
territory in what the international community deems an
illegitimate fashion. Prominent examples include South
Africa’s occupation of Namibia after the United Nations
withdrew its mandate, the State Law and Order Council’s
regime in Burma (Myanmar), and the Taliban’s government
in Afghanistan. Despite the effective control exercised by
these regimes, contemporary norms of human rights and
democracy have led the international community to refuse
them recognition.
Second, even prior to the establishment of the United
Nations, governments-in-exile did, under certain exigent
circumstances, enjoy legal status despite their inability to
exercise effective control over their territory or
constituency:
Between the 1920s and the 1940s recognized
governments-in-exile were for the most part
governments deposed by a native or foreign regime.
They were recognized as the legal and de jure
sovereign power of their country, and were treated ‘as
if they were still ruling the state even though their
217
government had lost effective control.’

During World War II, the Allies extended this precedent.
Deposed regimes of Nazi-occupied Europe retained de jure
recognition that entitled their political leaders to diplomatic
immunity and other rights. Under the Maritime Courts Act
of 1941, for example, the Allied governments-in-exile
enjoyed jurisdiction over their nationals residing in foreign
states. This meant, inter alia, that they could maintain
must “recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia” and refrain
from acts or dealings with the South African government respecting or implying
recognition of the government’s authority in this territory); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202(2) (1987).
217
Shain, supra note 45, at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted ).
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armies, control assets situated outside their occupied
territory, and try their own nationals for specified
offenses.218 At the same time, “[t]he Allied powers, using
the legal democratic principle to justify their recognition of
the deposed governments, were hesitant to grant similar
recognition to Charles de Gaulle’s Free French which had
no legal status prior to its creation.”219
Governments-in-exile during World War II thus
established two crucial legal precedents: First, the Allies’
treatment of deposed European governments as de jure
sovereigns emphasized the emerging criteria of liberal
democratic legitimacy and a movement away from strict
reliance on the Tinoco “effective control” criterion. Second,
given sufficient recognition and the existence of a host
state, the deposed European governments-in-exile, though
unable to secure control of their territory, showed that
governments without corresponding states can still perform
some of the characteristic functions of a sovereign.
Based on historical precedents, Yossi Shain therefore
notes that governments-in-exile historically have fallen into
three principal categories:220 (1) lawfully elected, traditional
or authentic exiles, who do not challenge the existence of a
given state but claim title as its genuine representative
(e.g., the deposed Spanish Republican government, which
existed from the outset of the Spanish Civil War in the
1930s until the first democratic elections in Spain in 1977);
(2) governments aspiring to statehood, characteristic of the
era of decolonization (e.g., the self-proclaimed Sahawari
Arab Democratic Republic, formed to challenge the
annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco); and (3) deposed
regimes struggling to regain power lost to a foreign invader
218

Shain, supra note 43, at 224; see, e.g., Neth. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d
405 (2d Cir. 1953) (giving effect to legislation and regulations of the Netherlands
government-in-exile passed during World War II); but see Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of
Union of Burma v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
219
Shain, supra note 43, at 225.
220
Id. at 2-5
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(e.g.,
the
London-based
governments-in-exile
of
Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Yugoslavia, and Belgium, which subsisted during
World War II). These categories are dynamic, and the
status of governments-in-exile may vary over time. The
Tibetan government-in-exile, for example, should be
categorized simultaneously under both (1) and (3). In
theory, classification does not render a putative government
more or less legitimate; in practice, however, the “support of
[government-in-exiles’] alleged constituencies may be the
most critical factor in determining validity of their claim
and the attitude of foreign patrons toward their
struggles.”221
Accordingly, the Tibetan government-in-exile cannot be
established as legally legitimate (or illegitimate);
unequivocal international legal criteria capable of
bestowing these labels simply do not exist at present. From
the perspective of Tinoco, China’s puppet government in the
222
From the
TAR is the legitimate government of Tibet.
perspective of the Tobar approach, by contrast, the Dalai
Lama’s government remains the legitimate political
representative of Tibet.223 While the Tibetan governmentin-exile therefore continues—largely because of China’s
geopolitical and economic influence and permanent seat on
the U.N. Security Council—to suffer from a lack of political
recognition, it enjoys, as measured by emerging criteria, a
strong claim to legal recognition.

221

Id. at 5.
For a description of the TAR’s de jure and de facto governmental power
structure, see INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET & THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW GROUP, THE MYTH OF TIBETAN AUTONOMY (1994).
223
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 184. For more recent evidence of
continuing support within Tibet for the Dalai Lama and his government, see TIBET
INFO. NETWORK & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CUTTING OFF THE SERPENT’S HEAD
(1996).
222
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C. Civil Recognition: The Self-Determination of Peoples and
Putative Governments

Contemporary trends in international law also animate
civil recognition practices toward the Tibetan governmentin-exile. Recently, there has been what some scholars call a
“paradigm shift in the legal norms that govern regime
224
Increasingly, the recognition of
legitimation.”
governments-in-exile has been based on criteria connected
to popular sovereignty. This is true most often of putative
regimes that represent a “dispossessed government trying
to prolong a de jure international status” in the face of
foreign military occupation or a coup rather than—as most
post-War governments-in-exile had been—“aspiring exiled
contenders seeking to transform their self-proclaimed de
jure status into de facto control of a given target
territory.”225 The post-War establishment of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
the subsequent proliferation of treaties constitutive of the
contemporary international human rights regime226
contributed to entrenching the “self-determination of
peoples”227 as a paramount principle of governmental
legitimacy. In theory, the United Nations therefore now
serves as the “custodian of collective legitimacy . . . .”228
In practice, however, most post-War governments-in-exile
have been, by contrast to the exile governments of World
War II, self-proclaimed liberation movements,229 “whose
224

Edward Collins, Jr. & Timothy M. Cole, Regime Legitimation in Instances of
Coup-Caused Governments-in-Exile: The Cases of Presidents Makarios and Aristide,
5 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 199, 199 (1996); see also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990).
225
Shain, supra note 43.
226
See id. (noting that in the post-war period, “individuals, not only governments,
[became] legal entities in the eyes of international law”.).
227
U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
228
Inis L. Claude, Jr., Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the
United Nations, 20 INT’L ORG. 367, 367-68 (Summer 1966); see generally DUGARD,
supra note 7.
229
See Shain, supra note 45, at 227.
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existence is by nature tenuous.”230 The United Nations and
its constituent states, too, continue to employ recognition of
governments as a political tool, often unrelated to the “selfdetermination of peoples” criterion. To take one (apropos)
example,
despite the fact that the U.N. Charter prohibits the
acquisition of territory and the annexation of people by
means of force, a majority of governments has avoided
challenging the annexation of Tibet by China, and has
denied recognition to the Dalai Lama’s government-inexile, even though it has enjoyed the overwhelming
support of the Tibetans in the diaspora and under
Chinese occupation. At the same time, Pol Pot’s
criminal DK exiled government has been granted
recognition as the authentic representative of the
people of Cambodia, on whom it has been perpetrating
231
genocide.

But the principles (or lack thereof) that govern political
recognition of governments-in-exile should be distinguished
232
With respect to
from those that confer civil legitimacy.
the latter, for instance, Reisman argues that, while not yet
instantiated, “aspirational norms provide a positive
environment for appraising domestic contexts with
international criteria and for legitimizing the use of the
technique of governments-in-exile.”233 Indeed, the Second
Circuit recently confirmed this trend toward distinguishing
political recognition from tacit declarations of legitimacy.
In National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf,
the court wrote: “[A]s this century draws to a close, the
practice of extending formal recognition to new
governments has altered: The United States Department of
State has sometimes refrained from announcing recognition
230
231
232
233

Id. at 21.
Id. at 234.
See id. at 235.
Reisman, supra note 55, at 242.
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of a new government because grants of recognition have
been misinterpreted as pronouncements of approval [i.e.,
legitimacy].”234
The Tibetan government-in-exile continues to suffer from
a lack of political recognition, but to the extent that we
appraise civil recognition criteria, it retains a strong claim
to legitimacy. Shain notes that “[w]hether governments-inexile are fictional entities or serious contenders is a
function of their ability to obtain the loyalty of their states’
constituencies . . . and to mobilize foreign support for their
goal . . . diplomatic recognition is only one among many
factors, neither sufficient nor necessary . . . .”235 Based on
Word War II and post-War precedents, the additional
factors to be considered in the modern world order arguably
include a government-in-exile’s (1) continuity with a prior
existing regime, which retains a legitimate claim to
authority over the territory and people it aspires to govern;
(2) resilience, a putative government’s ability to project,
under the auspices of a host state, an enduring
international profile to challenge the legitimacy of the
ruling regime; (3) efficacy, the ability of a putative
government to exercise some traditional functions of
sovereignty and to provide aid and assistance to its
constituency in exile; and (4) popular support, the degree of
civil support enjoyed by a putative government from both
its exile and aspirational constituency.

234

Nat’l Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir.
1988) (citing 77 STATE DEP’T BULL. 462-63 (Oct. 10, 1977)); see also Sean D. Murphy
& Mary Beth West, The Impact of U.S. Litigation on Non-Recognition of Foreign
Governments, 26 STAN. J. INT’L L. 435, 436 (1990) (noting that in the twentieth
century recognition began to signify “not merely realistic appraisal of a new entity’s
status but approval of the entity itself,” and consequently, “the United States [has
become] unwilling to ‘recognize’ governments that, although admittedly in control of
their states, [are] essentially anti-democratic”); see also Murphy & West, supra at
436 n.103 (1990) (citing 1969 statements by the Senate and the executive branch
indicating that recognition and the exchange of diplomatic representatives does not
imply U.S. approval of the “form, ideology, or policy” of the recognized government).
235
Shain, supra note 45, at 232.
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Measured by these criteria, the Tibetan government-inexile maintains a high degree of civil recognition: The Dalai
Lama’s putative government is not a “self-proclaimed
liberation movement.” To the contrary, it remains the
direct successor of the government forced into exile by
China’s military invasion in 1949. Its subsequent adoption
of a constitution that provides for free and fair elections
bolsters its legitimacy under contemporary norms of
democracy. In July 2001, in fact, more than 100,000
Tibetans living in exile went to the polls to elect their first
Prime Minister, Samdong Rinpoche.
The Tibetan government-in-exile has also proved
remarkably resilient.
Ever since the Dalai Lama’s
entourage arrived in exile in March 1959, India has
provided the government-in-exile with an amiable host
state. India maintains historical, religious, and cultural
affinities with Tibet; and large sectors of its population
revere the personage of the Dalai Lama. Consequently,
then Prime Minister Nehru officially welcomed the Dalai
Lama when he arrived in India,236 and the State of India
has since provided his exile government with a de facto
territory, employment, and humanitarian aid.237
The
Tibetan government-in-exile’s enduring presence as a
quasi-state actor—enhanced in no small part by the Dalai
Lama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989—continues
to challenge the Chinese government’s claim to “ownership”
of Tibet.238
The Tibetan government-in-exile has also been
remarkably effective. Operating outside its aspirational
territory, it has nonetheless been able to cultivate Tibetan
culture abroad, provide education for its growing
constituency, preserve the Tibetan national identity,
provide assistance to the continuing influx of refugees
236

See French, supra note 45, at 188, 190.
See id. at 192.
238
See INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, TIBET—ITS OWNERSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (1992).
237
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entering through Nepal and Bhutan,239 participate (through
the auspices of sympathetic NGOs) in international and
national conferences and human rights fora, mobilize its
people in diaspora, and—despite its lack of formal
recognition—enlist a remarkable degree of support from
foreign nations. French observes that
the tremendous success of the Tibetan refugees and
their government-in-exile in preserving their own
identities and cultural heritage has stood as an
example for refugee organizations throughout the
world.
Thirty years after the diaspora, Tibetan
refugees have provided for the material success of their
refugee
population,
educated
their
children,
reconstructed much of their culture, preserved their
religion and its monastic class, and kept a high degree
240
of international profile.

Finally, while a precise measure of the political support
enjoyed by the Dalai Lama’s government within its
aspirational territory (historical Tibet) is not possible to
gauge, available evidence overwhelmingly suggests that
Tibetans within China continue to regard the Dalai Lama
and his government-in-exile as the legitimate authority in
Tibet.241
According to credible reports, most ordinary
Tibetans view Chinese government officials as foreign
elements, wholly without popular support.242
Each of these four criterion, then, supports the conclusion
that the Tibetan government-in-exile, like the Tibetan
state, retains a strong claim to legitimacy bolstered by civil
239

For a description of the Tibetan government-in-exile’s work establishing a
Tibetan community in exile in Nepal, see generally ANN ARMBRECHT FORBES,
SETTLEMENTS OF HOPE: AN ACCOUNT OF TIBETAN REFUGEES IN NEPAL (1989).
240
French, supra note 45, at 200.
241
E.g., VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 185.
242
E.g., UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS, TIBET
SUPPORT GROUP NEDERLAND, & INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, supra note
88, at 74-75.
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recognition. Again, these practices do not change the
undeniable fact that China exercises effective control over
Tibet or that every state in the world formally accepts Tibet
as part of China. But civil recognition practices do ensure
that the international legitimacy that China seeks
desperately remains beyond its political power to compel;
and legitimacy is more crucial than may generally be
recognized. Without it, for example, China must spend
millions of dollars annually to finance a large military and
police force in Tibet; to encourage ethnic Chinese to resettle
in Tibet in order to consolidate its base of political loyalty;
to counter, thus far unsuccessfully, world opinion that
remains highly critical of its human rights practices in
Tibet; and above all, to govern effectively a foreign people,
with a distinct language, set of values, cultural history, and
loyalty—a people who for the most part decisively reject
China’s authority in Tibet.
That governments presently lack the political will to take
more meaningful steps toward recognizing the state of Tibet
and its putative government formally may reflect a
misperception of the political consequences that would
follow; and, more to the point, a failure to appreciate that,
by neglecting to challenge China’s revisionist history and
claim to sovereignty in Tibet, these states confer a venire of
legitimacy on an ongoing violation of international law.
The question therefore becomes whether civil and legal
recognition, in the face of realpolitik, can help vindicate an
unjustly denied right to political recognition over time. To
conclude, I focus on one prominent example in which it, at a
minimum, contributed to this vindication: East Timor.
CONCLUSION

In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor. Like Tibet, East
Timor contains a wealth of natural resources and is
geographically attached to its—now former—occupying
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power.243 In the sixteenth century, Portugal colonized the
island of Timor, and for more than two hundred years, it
shared colonial control with Holland, which established
authority over the surrounding region, the former Dutch
East Indies. In 1913, Holland and Portugal separated West
and East Timor by treaty.244 Then, in 1949, at the outset of
the decolonization era, Indonesia gained independence.
West Timor chose to join the nascent state. But East Timor
remained under Portuguese control for the next twenty-five
years, oppressed by the fascist regimes of Antonio de
Oliveirea Salazar (1933-71) and Marcello Caetano (197174).245 On April 25, 1974, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho,
leading a number of military officers, orchestrated the
“Carnation Revolution,” overthrowing Caetano’s brutal
regime. The new Portuguese government, reacting to
international pressure and military necessity, began to
dismantle Portugal’s colonial empire.
In August 1975, internal political fractions within East
Timor’s newly established political parties culminated in a
brief civil war. Fretelin, the most pro-independence party
quickly emerged victorious.246
From September to
December 1975, Fretelin exercised effective control over
East Timor because, during the civil war, the Portuguese
interim-governor and his decolonization administration
abdicated their responsibilities and fled. Like Britain’s
abdication of responsibility for Tibet after India gained its
independence in 1949, Portugal’s lasseiz-faire approach left
East Timor in legal limbo. Portugal refused to recognize
Fretelin’s declaration of independence on November 28,
243

See SONNY INBARAJ, EAST TIMOR: BLOOD AND TEARS IN ASEAN 21 (1995). The
Portuguese initially exploited East Timor for its sandalwood, a resource now largely
depleted; later, East Timor became valued for its agricultural exports, including
coffee, rubber, copra, and peanuts. Additionally, “[t]here are extensive fish stocks
and significant oil reserves along the southern coast and in the Timor Gap between
East Timor and Australia.” Id.
244
Id. at 20.
245
See id.
246
See id. at 29, 37.
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1975, but it also declined to resume responsibility for East
Timor’s decolonization. The Democratic Republic of East
Timor therefore remained suspended in political limbo,
powerless to invoke either Portuguese assistance or the
authority of the United Nations when, just two weeks later,
Indonesia launched a blitzkrieg assault on Dili and annexed
East Timor.247 As in Tibet, a guerilla war ensued.248 East
Timorese resistance fighters sought to dispel the occupying
foreign forces, which committed massive human rights
abuses in an effort to consolidate their control. By 1979,
Indonesia’s brutal efforts to crush resistance in East Timor
had displaced approximately 300,000 East Timorese—
nearly half the population—into “controlled hamlets,”
249
where about 200,000 died of starvation and illness.
Here, however, the parallel to Tibet ends. The United
Nations rejected Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of
East Timor, refused to recognize its authority, called upon
Suharto’s government to withdraw its troops immediately,
and affirmed the right of the East Timorese people freely to
determine their political status.250
Security Council
Resolution 384, issued on December 22, 1975, recognized
“the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to selfdetermination and independence” and called upon all states
247

Indonesia invaded East Timor the day after then President Gerald Ford and
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger completed a visit to Jakarta, and the United
States apparently acquiesced, convinced by Indonesian President Suharto’s
characterization of Fretelin as a communist party.
248
See id. at 46, 57-58. For an account of Tibet’s guerilla resistance movement,
which lasted from roughly 1959 to the early 1970s, supported for much of this time
by the American CIA, see JOHN KENNETH KNAUS, ORPHANS OF THE COLD WAR:
AMERICA AND THE TIBETAN STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL (1999).
249
See INBARAJ, supra note 241, at 68.
250
Two Security Council resolutions, eight General Assembly resolutions, and
two Human Rights Commission resolutions were issued condemning Indonesia’s
occupation of and human rights violations within East Timor. See S.C. Res. 384
(Dec. 22, 1975); S.C. Res. 389 (Apr. 22, 1976); G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX) (Dec. 12, 1975);
G.A. Res. 31/53 (Dec. 1, 1976); G.A. Res. 32/34 (Nov. 28, 1977); G.A. Res. 33/39 (Dec.
13, 1978); G.A. Res. 34/40 (Nov. 21, 1979); G.A. Res. 35/27 (Nov. 11, 1980); G.A. Res.
36/50 (Nov. 24, 1981); G.A. Res. 37/30 (Nov. 23, 1982); H.R. Comm. Res. on the
Situation in East Timor (Mar. 11, 1993); H.R. Comm. Res. 387 (Apr. 16, 1997).
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“to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as
the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in
accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).”251
Unlike Tibet, which every state acknowledges as part of
China, only a handful of states—including, regrettably, the
United States, which viewed Indonesia as an ally against
communist expansion during the Cold War—recognized
East Timor as a de facto part of Indonesia.252 Many,
including China, expressly rejected Indonesia’s claim,
declaring East Timor an independent state under illegal
foreign occupation.253 In terms of political recognition, then,
East Timor, unlike Tibet, never suffered international
neglect at the level of state opinion—even though, like
Tibet, most states treated East Timor in practice as part of
Indonesia.
But in terms of legal and civil recognition, East Timor
never became part of Indonesia. Unlike China, Indonesia,
itself a former colony, could not claim that East Timor had
“always” been part of its territory. Nor could it invoke any
treaty, like the 17-Point Agreement, that purported to
“reunite” East Timor with Indonesia. Its sole claim to
254
sovereignty consisted in military annexation, which, as
noted, no longer remains a valid means to acquire territory.
Popular moral opinion, as well as legal and political
recognition practices, rejected Indonesia’s annexation of
East Timor.255
251

S.C. Res. 384 (Dec. 22, 1975).
The United States never formally recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty, but it
treated Indonesia as its de facto government. Significantly, in light of later
developments, Australia was one of the only states to recognize the de jure
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. See Christine M. Chinkin, East Timor
Moves to the World Court, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 206, 207 (1993) (quoting AUSTL. DEP’T
OF FOREIGN AFF., ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 30 (1979)).
253
See Grant, supra note 7, at 299 n.96. These included “Angola, Cape Verde,
Guinea- Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Albania, Benin, Cambodia,
the People’s Republic of China, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea (Conakry), North Korea,
Laos, Vietnam, and Tanzania.” Id. (emphasis added).
254
See id. at 276 n.6.
255
See, e.g., Let East Timor Vote, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 15, 16;
252
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These recognition practices—political, legal, and civil—
meant that the international community never accepted in
theory, even though its actions tended to reflect in practice,
Indonesia’s assertion of sovereignty over East Timor.
Indeed, the complexity and tensions surrounding the
modern concept of recognition emerged in the Case
Concerning East Timor. There, Portugal contended that
international law—in particular, U.N. resolutions
condemning Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor—obliged
states not to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in East
Timor.256 The majority held otherwise, concluding that
these resolutions do not “impos[e] an obligation on States
not to recognize any authority on the part of Indonesia over
the Territory;” nor can it “be inferred from the sole fact that
the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly
and the Security Council refer to Portugal as the
administering [p]ower of East Timor that they intended to
establish an obligation on third States to treat exclusively
with Portugal as regards the continental shelf of East
257
Timor.”
The majority therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction, for
any ruling on the merits would require adjudication of the
rights and duties of Indonesia, a non-party over which the
ICJ could not exercise compulsory jurisdiction.258 Judge
Oda concurred on the grounds that the U.N. resolution did
not provide Portugal with standing, even if it did establish
a rule of nonrecognition toward Indonesia’s claim to
sovereignty over East Timor, which, he noted, it had

UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATION, THE QUESTION OF SELFDETERMINATION: THE CASES OF EAST TIMOR, TIBET AND WESTERN SAHARA (1996);
East Timor Action Network, at http://www.etan.org/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
256
East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30). For analysis, see
generally Grant, supra note 7, at 300-10; Michael Shane French-Merrill, Note, The
Role of the United Nations and Recognition in Sovereignty Determinations: How
Australia Breached Its International Obligations in Ratifying the Timor Gap Treaty,
8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285 (2000).
257
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103-04.
258
See id. at 105.
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annexed by illegal force.259
Judges Weeraantry and
Skubiszewski, by contrast, concluded that a law of nonrecognition derived from the prohibition on the acquisition
of territory by force—established in the former’s view by
U.N. resolutions concerning East Timor, and in the latter’s,
by general principles of international law that operate erga
omnes—precluded states from recognizing Indonesia’s
sovereignty in East Timor.260
The East Timor case did not, however, establish a
mandatory rule of nonrecognition; if anything, its majority
holding reaffirmed the discretionary nature of recognition
in the absence of an express rule of law to the contrary
prescribed by the Security Council (such as Resolution 662
promulgated in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). But
at the same time, it indicates the increasing complexity of
recognition practices and law in situations where there has
been a clear violation of the right to self-determination—for
the court, despite its jurisdictional holding, reaffirmed this
261
right in the penultimate paragraph of its judgment.
In 1999, Indonesian citizens forced the resignation of
President Suharto. This initiated a dramatic change in
Indonesia’s internal politics; and in short time, East Timor
became an issue. While the cost in human life and political
friction was high, East Timor ultimately received the right
to a referendum supervised by the United Nations. In
1999, its people went to the polls to exercise their right to
self-determination. Presently under a U.N. mandate, East
Timor will soon attain independence in accordance with the
freely expressed desires of its national polis. On August 30,
2001, East Timor held its first elections.262

259

Id. at 116 (Oda, J., concurring).
See id. at 202 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); see id. at 262 (Skubiszewski, J.,
dissenting).
261
See id. at 105-06.
262
East Timor Holds First Free Election Since Winning Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at A7.
260
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***
The principles of decolonization, the self-determination of
peoples, and the emerging right to democratic governance
impute a continuing legitimacy to the State of Tibet and the
Dalai Lama’s exile government—validated by legal and
civil, if not yet political, recognition. This does not, of
course, translate into an international legal imperative to
take action to vindicate the Tibetan people’s rights under
international law. But the development of recognition
practices in the post-War era, at a minimum, complicates
the question of Tibet’s legal status. Unlike in the case of
East Timor, legal and civil recognition practices toward
Tibet remain in conflict with the prevailing political
recognition practices of states. For China, this means that
Tibet continues to be a diplomatic liability; and this itself is
critical to ensure that the Tibetan people’s rights do not
atrophy with the passage of time or become obscured by
fictional historical and legal claims. Normative recognition
practices, in short, may fail to compel states to follow suit
politically, but they do have, in the long term, real influence
on the public world order.
Since 1959, debate on the issue of Tibet’s legal status in
international political fora has been tabled.
China’s
political and economic power, coupled with its veto power as
a permanent member of the Security Council, for the time
being prevent any serious action.263 But as China continues
to deflect criticism of its human rights practices with
statements decrying the legacy of Western imperialism and
colonialism,264 it is, at a minimum, ironic that U.N. member
states remain hesitant to confront China with its own
263

Indeed, in the 1959 debates in the General Assembly, India “questioned the
purpose of debating the situation in Tibet in the United Nations since ‘nobody is
going to send an army to Tibet or China.’” INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2,
at 61 (citing U.N. Doc. A/PV.834, Oct. 21, 1959, para. 89 (statement of the Indian
representative)).
264
E.g., Statement of Mr. Wang GuangYa, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC, at
the Asia Regional Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference Against Racism,
Teheran, Feb. 19, 2001.
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practices of colonization in Tibet—and, we should add, East
Turkestan (Xinjiang) and “Inner” Mongolia.
To recognize Tibet’s status formally as a de jure state
under illegal foreign occupation would be unlikely to work
dramatic improvements in Tibet’s prospects in the short
term. Nor, however, would it be likely to exacerbate them.
At most, it would provoke a vehement rhetorical response
from China and symbolic retaliation. But with China under
international scrutiny for Beijing’s pledge to host the 2008
Olympic Games, China’s economic need for free trade with
the United States and European markets, and with its
WTO membership still precarious, it seems unlikely that
this minor step would lead China’s present government to
take drastic measures (e.g., to cut off diplomatic ties or
sever economic relations); it cannot afford that risk. And
appeasement of China’s fiction of territorial sovereignty
over Tibet, as Tibet’s tragic history for the past half-century
makes clear, has hardly proven effective. For as long as the
international community continues to indulge the fiction
that Tibet is “part of” China, China’s political elite will
continue to claim “interference in internal affairs” as a
shield to fend off criticism of its alleged “ownership” of Tibet
and scrutiny of its human rights abuses against the Tibetan
people. To challenge this fiction will not by itself restore
Tibet’s sovereignty. But it will prevent the issue of Tibet’s
status from vanishing behind the venire of legitimacy
generated by years of CCP propaganda and international
acquiescence. It may therefore prove the first step—and an
essential predicate—toward vindicating the Tibetan
people’s right to self-determination.
It would be misguided to analogize simply East Timor’s
occupation by Indonesia to Tibet’s occupation by China.
But the general refusal to recognize Indonesia’s legal right
to sovereignty over East Timor in the long-term helped to
validate the East Timorese people’s right to selfdetermination. States could similarly recognize China’s de
facto effective control over Tibet without, as they do today,
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indulging the fiction of its de jure sovereignty and
legitimacy. Such a shift in policy toward China’s claim to
“ownership” of Tibet—i.e., to recognize it as an occupying
power rather than a legitimate sovereign—may in time
enable Tibetans to reassert their equally, if not more, valid
claim to self-determination and national sovereignty. And
to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of recognition in
contemporary international law may help to ensure, more
generally, that the “self-determination of peoples” does not
disintegrate into an empty relic of the era of
decolonization—for assertions of this right, as recent events
in Kosovo, Chechnya, and elsewhere suggest, remain
unlikely to diminish of their own accord.

